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Ever since Justice Holmes opined that “[t]he most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic,”1 debate has raged over what should be required for a challenged regulation
of speech to survive First Amendment attack. The Supreme Court’s approach has
been anything but tidy. In one famous article, Geoffrey Stone identified seven
different standards of review that the Court has used to evaluate laws that regulate
speech or expression without reference to the content of the regulated speech, and
three more for laws that are content-based.2
Scholars have struggled to explain our sprawling First Amendment doctrine—
once described by Justice Stevens as “an elaborate mosaic of specific judicial
decisions, characteristic of the common law process of case-by-case adjudication.”3
The position that has gained the most traction in recent scholarship has stressed the

† Copyright © 2011 Lawrence Rosenthal.
∗ Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. I am deeply indebted to
Joseph Blocher, Jefferson Powell, Rodney Smolla, and my colleague Ron Rotunda for
generously providing me with enormously helpful comments on earlier drafts. Many thanks
are owed as well to Isa Lang, Matthew Price, and Ali Ostrander for highly capable research
assistance.
1. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
2. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47–54
(1987). For more recent summaries of the rather elaborate structure of First Amendment
doctrine, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.1 (8th ed.
2010); 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 2:61–:72
(2009).
3. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1300 (1993).
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primacy of governmental motive—this school of thought argues that the
constitutionality of a challenged regulation is effectively based on an assessment of
the likelihood that the regulation reflects a governmental motive to burden
disfavored speech or speakers.4 Then-Professor Elena Kagan, one of the leading
advocates of this purposivist view of First Amendment jurisprudence, put it this
way: “First Amendment law, as developed by the Supreme Court over the past
several decades, has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of
improper governmental motives.”5
To be sure, the Supreme Court has expressed doubt about making the
constitutionality of legislation turn on the legislature’s purpose in light of the
hazards of determining the collective motivation of a legislature.6 Purposivists
argue, however, that the difficulties in ascertaining motive have led the Court to
develop doctrines that utilize proxies for impermissible motive.7 For example, the
Court’s use of strict scrutiny for laws directed at the content of speech is said to be
based on the risk that content regulation reflects official hostility to disfavored
content, coupled with the difficulties that inhere in requiring those seeking to
vindicate First Amendment rights to prove illicit motivation.8 Similarly, the
insistence of First Amendment jurisprudence on adequate standards to cabin the
discretion of officials who regulate speech is said to be based on a concern that

4. See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of
Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 931–54 (1993); Lillian R. BeVier,
The First Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be at the Switch?, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1280, 1289–93 (2005); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443–505
(1996); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 775–98
(2001); Srikanth Srinivasan, Incidental Restrictions on Speech and the First Amendment: A
Motive-Based Rationalization of the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 12 CONST. COMMENT.
401, 415–20 (1995); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 190, 195–204 (1988); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First
Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 624–35 (1991). Professor Stone, for his part, has
emphasized the importance of governmental motive but considers it one of several central
themes in First Amendment jurisprudence. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and
the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 227–33 (1983); Stone, supra note 2, at
54–57. The move toward purposivism in First Amendment scholarship seemingly has its
origins in John Ely’s seminal article on the role of governmental motive in constitutional
law. See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205, 1327–41 (1970).
5. Kagan, supra note 4, at 414.
6. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382–86 (1968). Purposivists, though
taking pains to note that they are not concerned with the intentions of individual legislators,
generally refer to governmental “motive” and “purpose” interchangeably. See, e.g., Kagan,
supra note 4, at 414–16, 427–42; Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 793–94, 826; Williams, supra
note 4, at 697–702. It seems they have been convinced by Professor Ely that there is no
meaningful distinction between legislative purpose and motive. See Ely, supra note 4, at
1217–21.
7. See Kagan, supra note 4, at 414; Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 775–76.
8. See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 4, at 1293–96; Kagan, supra note 4, at 438–72;
Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 785–87, 793; Stone, supra note 4, at 230–33; Strauss, supra note
4, at 192–95.
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absent such standards, regulation will be infected by difficult-to-detect illicit
motives.9 Conversely, generally applicable laws that nevertheless impose burdens
on expression are reviewed more deferentially because of the reduced likelihood
that such broad-based laws are intended to harm only disfavored speech or
speakers.10 A jurisprudence based on these kinds of categorical judgments about the
likelihood of an illicit governmental motive is thought to be preferable to one that
endeavors to balance the costs and benefits of a challenged regulation of speech
because the latter inquiry, it is said, cannot be performed in any principled way and
would instead amount to an invitation for unbridled judicial activism.11
The only frontal attack to date on the purposivist account has come from
perhaps the leading pragmatist of our day, Judge Richard Posner, who has argued
that speech regulations should be assessed by consideration of their costs and
benefits.12 Judge Posner contends that many aspects of First Amendment doctrine,
such as the Cold War–era Supreme Court’s decisions upholding prohibitions on
Communist advocacy, and more recent decisions upholding regulations on
pornography, reflect a willingness to uphold regulations likely to be infected by
official hostility to the speech at issue based on a pragmatic assessment of the
harmful tendencies of such speech and its limited benefits.13 Yet, the force of Judge
Posner’s argument, at least as a descriptive matter, is undercut by the Court’s
general unwillingness in recent decades to accept this type of “dangerous tendency”
claim. For example, unlike the Cold War–era cases,14 contemporary doctrine
generally protects “dangerous tendency” speech—such as speech advocating
violence or unlawful conduct—unless it is directed at producing imminent
violence.15 Obscenity doctrine as well seems to have evolved in a manner
consistent with the purposivist account; the Court, for example, has held that
determinations about whether sexually oriented expression lacks serious literary,

9. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 4, at 456–60; Strauss, supra note 4, at 196–97;
Williams, supra note 4, at 703–04.
10. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 4, at 491–505; Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 797;
Srinivasan, supra note 4, at 415–18; Williams, supra note 4, at 722–28.
11. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 4, at 932–45; Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 787–92.
12. See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment
Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 738–41 (2002).
13. See id. at 741–42. Barry McDonald has similarly called for pragmatic balancing in
First Amendment analysis, but unlike Judge Posner, he is willing to concede that this
approach is inconsistent with much of contemporary First Amendment doctrine, which
seems to him to reflect an inquiry into governmental motive. See Barry P. McDonald,
Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of
Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1393–426 (2006).
14. E.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228–30 (1961); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 508–11 (1951) (plurality opinion); id. at 546–56 (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
id. at 567–70 (Jackson, J., concurring).
15. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409–10 (1989); NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927–29 (1982); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105,
108–09 (1973) (per curiam); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (per
curiam).
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artistic, political, or scientific value may not be based on community standards
because of the risk that such evaluations will reflect hostility to unpopular views.16
Other scholars have offered what amount to quibbles.17 Frederick Schauer, for
example, has questioned the purposivist account by claiming that much

16. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987). To be sure, the Court has
tolerated regulation of sexually oriented expression when based on its secondary effects on
the surrounding community, see, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,
46–50 (1986), but purposivists claim that this doctrine reflects a reduced likelihood of
improper motivation when the regulation is justified on the basis of secondary effects rather
than the communicative effects of the regulated expression. See Kagan, supra note 4, at 483–
91; Williams, supra note 4, at 630–35.
17. In the category of quibbles, John Fee has identified what he claims are a number of
examples in which regulations reflecting a high likelihood of impermissible governmental
motivation are nevertheless subjected to less exacting judicial scrutiny—the regulation of
government-subsidized speech, the speech of public employees, and speech within specially
created governmental fora; the regulation of mass media and political campaign finance;
regulation protecting captive audiences from unwanted expression; and the regulation of
what is thought to be low-value speech, such as defamation, pornography, and fighting
words. See John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1136–47 (2005). But
these examples are not body blows to the purposivists. As for the first three categories,
purposivists acknowledge that speech by the government itself or within public institutions
represents a special case. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 4, at 432–33. The Court has explained
that it permits regulation that disadvantages particular speakers or viewpoints in this line of
cases “based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.”
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010). Indeed, there is a growing recognition
that public institutions must sometimes undertake to manage the content of speech within
those institutions in order to achieve otherwise constitutionally permissible objectives. See,
e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT
234–65 (1995); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 85–93 (2008); Frederick Schauer, Principles,
Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 106–18 (1998). As for mass
media, purposivists note that the Court has tolerated regulation in this area only when it
addresses bottlenecks that may reduce the overall quantity and diversity of speech, an
approach that suggests no illicit motive. See Kagan, supra note 4, at 464–65; Rubenfeld,
supra note 4, at 804 & n.80. As for campaign finance regulation, purposivists explain the
Court’s hostility toward regulations justified by limiting the influence of particular speakers
in the political process as based on the threat of improper motive. See Kagan, supra note 4, at
464–72; Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 802–07. Moreover, the Court has become increasingly
hostile to such regulation, stressing that Congress cannot be trusted to devise regulation that
may disadvantage particular speakers or viewpoints, such as those who may oppose
incumbent officeholders. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898–99, 904–05; Davis v.
FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773–74 (2008). As for judicial tolerance of regulation protecting
captive audiences, purposivists argue that this doctrine merely reflects proper solicitude for
the rights of listeners rather than an illicit motive. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 830–31. In
any event, this is a narrow doctrine, which generally has no application outside of the
regulation of unwanted speech in an unwilling listener’s home. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474, 484–85 (1988); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209–11 (1975);
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974) (per curiam); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 21 (1971). As for so-called low-value speech, purposivists argue that with the
possible exception of obscenity, these regulations, by fully protecting political speech and
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uncontroversial regulation of speech as an aspect of unlawful conduct—as in laws
against fraud or discrimination—reflects a governmental effort to punish disfavored
messages.18 Purposivists, however, have a powerful answer to this objection; as we
have seen, they argue that laws of general applicability—such as generally
applicable laws forbidding fraud or discrimination—present little danger of
suppressing speech on any identifiable subjects and therefore create little risk that
only those who address unpopular subjects will face regulation.19
Conversely, Eugene Volokh has quarreled with the purposivists’ claim that
generally applicable laws require no special First Amendment scrutiny, correctly
observing that even generally applicable enactments, such as breach-of-the-peace
or disorderly conduct laws, are subject to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny when
their application turns on the content of speech.20 The purposivists again have a
powerful response; their view is that even generally applicable laws, such as
breach-of-the-peace statutes, merit special scrutiny when they are not tied to
reasonably clear noncommunicative harms because in such cases they facilitate
enforcement against unpopular groups or views.21 Beyond that, another flaw in
Professor Volokh’s position, at least as a descriptive matter, is reflected in his
related argument that the First Amendment is offended by any regulation aimed at
the communicative impact of speech, regardless of motive: “Speech restrictions
that accomplish their ends by trying to stop people from persuading others are per
se unconstitutional, regardless of whether they are narrowly tailored to a
compelling interest (so long as the intent-imminence-likelihood threshold isn’t

permitting no prohibition on the expression of any identifiable viewpoint, pose little danger
of suppressing disfavored speech. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 4, at 472–81; Stone, supra
note 4, at 242–44. They add that First Amendment doctrine rarely permits regulation of
speech merely because it is thought to be of low value. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at
822–26. Even as to sexually oriented expression, First Amendment jurisprudence can be
understood to concern itself with the threat of illicit motive; as we have seen, the Court’s
obscenity jurisprudence does not permit assessments of the social value of speech to be
based on community standards because of a concern that this will disadvantage unpopular
speech or speakers. See supra text accompanying note 16. And the Court has utilized strict
scrutiny to evaluate prohibitions on such “low-value” but nonobscene speech by insisting
that it be tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest unrelated to the suppression
of ideas. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811–15 (2000);
Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126–27 (1989).
18. See Frederick Schauer, The Aim and the Target in Free Speech Methodology, 83
NW. U. L. REV. 562, 564–68 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 278–79 (1981).
19. See supra text accompanying note 10. Conversely, laws of this type that apply only
to particular speakers or messages are thought to offend the First Amendment because of the
risk that they reflect government hostility toward disfavored messages. See R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–94 (1992).
20. See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal
Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1287–93, 1301–03 (2005). The Supreme Court has recently
confirmed the soundness of this observation. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130
S. Ct. 2705, 2723–24 (2010).
21. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 4, at 461–64; Srinivasan, supra note 4, at 415–17;
Williams, supra note 4, at 701–02.
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crossed).”22 Nevertheless, the view that any law aimed at the communicative
effects of speech should be treated as suspect cannot explain large areas of doctrine,
such as pornography, “fighting words,” defamation, and commercial speech, where
such regulation is permitted.23 Indeed, Professor Volokh’s view seems to have been
decisively rejected only last Term, when the Court upheld a statutory prohibition on
providing “material support” to a foreign terrorist organization as applied to
support for a terrorist organization coming in the form of speech because of the
critical national security interests advanced by the prohibition, despite the fact that
the prohibition was necessarily based on the communicative effects of the speech at
issue.24
The Supreme Court, for its part, has been less than consistent on the role of
motive in First Amendment adjudication. Sometimes, the Court has acted
consistently with the purposivist account. In striking down a statute that prohibited
burning the American flag, for example, the Court wrote: “If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.”25 Similarly, in striking down a hate crime ordinance
even though it had been construed as proscribing only unprotected “fighting
words,” the Court wrote: “The First Amendment generally prevents government
from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the
ideas expressed.”26
On other occasions, however, the Court has struck a different note. In the Term
preceding the hate-crime case, for example, as the Court invalidated a state law
requiring that funds paid to the author of a book or other work of art that describes
a crime for which the author had been convicted be escrowed to ensure their
availability to satisfy a judgment against the author, the Court denied that
legislative motivation was at the core of First Amendment analysis:
The Board next argues that discriminatory financial treatment is suspect
under the First Amendment only when the legislature intends to

22. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2454 (1996).
23. See supra text accompanying note 16; see also Kagan, supra note 4, at 435–37,
472–83. When discussing speech intended to persuade others to engage in illegal activities,
the Court has more recently reiterated that some speech is treated as unprotected precisely
because of its communicative effects:
[O]ffers to give or receive what it is unlawful to possess have no social value
and thus, like obscenity, enjoy no First Amendment protection. Many long
established criminal proscriptions—such as laws against conspiracy,
incitement, and solicitation—criminalize speech (commercial or not) that is
intended to induce or commence illegal activities. Offers to provide or requests
to obtain unlawful material, whether as part of a commercial exchange or not,
are similarly undeserving of First Amendment protection.
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008) (citations omitted).
24. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2724–31.
25. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
26. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citations omitted).
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suppress certain ideas. This assertion is incorrect; our cases have
consistently held that “[i]llicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non
of a violation of the First Amendment.” . . . “We have long recognized
that even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can
restrict unduly the exercise of rights protected by the First
Amendment.”27
The Court later upheld a Colorado statute limiting the ability of protesters to
approach patients outside of health care facilities on the basis of the state’s interest
in protecting patient privacy,28 even though it was undisputed that the statute’s
enactment was primarily motivated by the activities of antiabortion protesters.29
Apparently indifferent to the risk that the law reflected legislative hostility to the
right-to-life message, the Court denied that “a statute is ‘viewpoint based’ simply
because its enactment was motivated by the conduct of the partisans on one side of
a debate.”30 Instead, the Court concluded that the statute was “content-neutral”
for three independent reasons. First, it is not a “regulation of speech.”
Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur.
Second, it was not adopted “because of disagreement with the message
it conveys.” This conclusion is supported not just by the Colorado
courts’ interpretation of legislative history, but more importantly by the
State Supreme Court’s unequivocal holding that the statute’s
“restrictions apply equally to all demonstrators, regardless of
viewpoint, and the statutory language makes no reference to the content
of the speech.” Third, the State’s interests in protecting access and
privacy, and providing the police with clear guidelines, are unrelated to
the content of the demonstrators’ speech.31
Thus, the Court seems to have focused on the operation of the challenged statute
and not the threat of impermissible motivation. Still, purposivists might take
comfort in the Court’s emphasis on the statute’s general applicability as minimizing
the risk of discrimination against disfavored speech or speakers.
This article offers a challenge to the purposivist account. It begins, in Part I, by
considering the claims of the purposivists in light of the original meaning of the
First Amendment. Part I offers the first exploration in the scholarly literature of the
original meaning of the First Amendment in light of the recent turn in scholarly and
judicial thinking about originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation.
Although there is something of a scholarly consensus that the intentions of those
who framed the First Amendment are impossible to determine, in recent years
originalist thinking about constitutional interpretation has made a dramatic move
away from a jurisprudence based on the intentions of the framers or ratifiers and

27. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
117 (1991) (citations omitted) (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983)).
28. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–18 (2000).
29. Id. at 715.
30. Id. at 724.
31. Id. at 719–20 (footnote omitted).
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toward the original public meaning of constitutional text as the touchstone for
constitutional interpretation. An inquiry into original public meaning offers a bit
more clarity about the original meaning of the First Amendment than originalintention originalism was able to generate and provides reason to question the
purposivist account.
Part II examines the purposivist account of First Amendment jurisprudence as it
has evolved since the framing. Much as John Ely used a then-unresolved issue of
First Amendment law to illustrate the structure of First Amendment doctrine,32 Part
II illustrates the role of governmental purpose in First Amendment doctrine by
considering a yet-unresolved issue that has divided the lower courts and
commentators—the extent to which the First Amendment constrains the ability of
the government to undertake investigations on the basis of the protected speech of
the investigation’s target. Terrorism investigations, for example, can be triggered
when the government becomes aware of political extremists as a consequence of
their statements expressing approval of jihadist violence, or their attendance at
events that condone such conduct, even though these activities are constitutionally
protected under contemporary doctrine.33 The purposivist account suggests these
“First Amendment investigations” must clear the hurdle of strict scrutiny because,
in the absence of sufficient standards to limit the discretion of investigators, they
are unacceptably likely to be infected by governmental hostility toward the target’s
ideology. Indeed, history suggests that the risk that an impermissible motivation
may accompany such investigations is quite real.
Yet, subjecting the government’s decision to undertake an investigation to strict
scrutiny is inconsistent with fundamental principles of First Amendment doctrine
that suggest that the government’s effort to learn more about those who may be
plotting to break the law should not be equated to a legal prohibition on
constitutionally protected speech. The use of strict scrutiny to assess the propriety
of an investigation encounters potent pragmatic objections as well—it is often
necessary to undertake an investigation without having any clear idea of what it
will uncover; and because investigations do not pose the same threat to free speech
as prohibitions, they should not require an equivalent justification. At least on any
attractive and coherent account, the interaction between the First Amendment and
criminal investigations involves an assessment of the justification for the
investigation and the extent to which it inhibits constitutionally protected activity—
precisely the kind of pragmatic balancing that the purposivists denounce.34

32. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975).
33. See supra text accompanying note 15.
34. Questions about what kind of justification is sufficient for regulating (or
investigating) speech should be distinguished from questions about the justifications for
constitutional protection for speech. Frederick Schauer has provided a helpful three-part
typology of the arguments supporting constitutional protection for speech: first, arguments
that claim protection for speech as an activity that is essential to the process of public
deliberation necessary for a politically accountable democracy; second, arguments that claim
protection for speech as an activity that is essential to the search for truth; and third,
arguments that claim protection for speech as an activity that enables individuals to pursue
an essential component of a widely shared conception of the good life. See FREDERICK
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Finally, Part III considers the structure of First Amendment doctrine. Part III
contends that current doctrine reflects the centrality of pragmatic balancing, with
the concept of a free marketplace of ideas providing the essential metric to govern
the balancing inquiry. Regulations likely to distort the marketplace of ideas impose
particularly heavy costs to First Amendment values, thereby requiring particularly
powerful justifications. To be sure, the purposivists are right that balancing can be
dangerously indeterminate, but First Amendment doctrine handles this objection
with a highly structured approach to balancing based on a series of categorical
judgments about the likelihood that a challenged regulation will distort the
marketplace of ideas.
Structured balancing, however, breaks down when it becomes difficult to assess
the likelihood that challenged government conduct will distort the marketplace of
ideas. A prime example of this problem is presented by First Amendment
investigations, which can be performed in a responsible and discrete fashion
unlikely to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights, or in an abusive and
oppressive fashion. When it comes to First Amendment investigations, ad hoc
balancing is the only tenable approach. Thus, in First Amendment jurisprudence,
pragmatic balancing is inescapable.
I. THE ELUSIVE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
One plausible reaction to the purposivists’ account of First Amendment doctrine
is to change the subject. Some might say that by focusing on the structure of judgemade doctrine, purposivists ask the wrong question. The Constitution is, after all,
written. One can argue that in light of the written character of the Constitution, the
proper starting point for any problem of constitutional law is by reference to the
meaning of the governing text, and the best way to understand a legal text is

SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 15–59 (1982). First Amendment doctrine
largely accepts all three justifications; while the Court has long regarded speech about
politics and government as at the core of the First Amendment, see, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–71 (1963), nonpolitical speech capable of advancing truth or a
conception of the good life has been protected as well:
It is no doubt true that a central purpose of the First Amendment “was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.” But our cases have never
suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic,
literary, or ethical matters—to take a nonexhaustive list of labels—is not
entitled to full First Amendment protection.
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (citations omitted) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)). Indeed, as we have seen, the Court has treated
sexually oriented speech as protected as long as it has any type of serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value, and has added that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is
not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a
‘particularized message’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson
Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.” Hurley v.
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (citation
omitted). Still, as we will see, the fact that given expressive activity falls within an accepted
justification for First Amendment protection does not mean it will receive such protection if
there are sufficient countervailing interests in regulating or proscribing the activity.
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originalist in character—by reference to its meaning at the time it was originally
adopted.35
In the 1970s and 1980s, originalists usually took the position that the text of the
Constitution should be interpreted with reference to the intentions of its framers.36
This approach confronted enormous difficulties. First, because the process of
adopting constitutional text is a collective one, the problems that inhere in an effort
to determine collective intention of those involved in framing and ratification are
great.37 Second, the rules for interpreting texts that the framers and ratifiers would
have understood as controlling in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries suggested
that they were to be interpreted according to the ordinarily understood meaning of
their terms, without regard to anyone’s subjective intentions.38
In the 1990s, however, originalists increasingly embraced the view that the
Constitution should be construed according to its meaning as understood by the
public in the framing era; this approach was said to avoid the difficulties in
ascertaining subjective yet collective intentions while vindicating the Constitution’s
character as a legal text.39

35. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 100–09 (2004); GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 92–94 (1992); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS 31–38 (1994); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 50–61 (1999); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 289–
92 (1988).
36. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363–72 (1977); Edwin Meese III, Interpreting the
Constitution, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 13
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990); Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (1988).
37. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 14–25 (2002);
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 284–398 (1988);
Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 456–74
(1984); Boris I. Bittker, Interpreting the Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers
Controlling? If Not, What Is?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 30–36 (1995); Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 209–22 (1980);
Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical
Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1989); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or to
It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587 (1997); Marc V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793–804 (1983).
38. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 340–65 (1996); Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in
Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1006–62 (1991);
Finkelman, supra note 37, at 351–58; H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985).
39. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 35, at 92–117; PERRY, supra note 35, at 28–53;
WHITTINGTON, supra note 35, at 160–212; Baade, supra note 38, at 1103–07; Jack M.
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 295–307 (2007); Steven
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104
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In the wake of this turn to original public meaning, originalism enjoyed quite a
comeback. Thomas Colby has written that “[t]he new originalism, reconstructed in
terms of original public meaning, is a theory on the rise.”40 Randy Barnett has
claimed that among academics, originalism has become “the prevailing approach to
constitutional interpretation.”41 James Ryan believes that “a compelling and
popular alternative theory has yet to emerge from the academy or from sitting
judges as a serious competitor to originalism.”42 In short, as Jamal Greene recently
observed, “originalism continues to sell.”43
Even the Supreme Court seems to have embraced public-meaning originalism.
In District of Columbia v. Heller,44 as it confronted the Second Amendment’s right
“to keep and bear Arms,”45 the Court wrote:
In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that “[t]he
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its word and
phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from
their technical meaning.” Normal meaning may of course include an
idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that

YALE L.J. 541, 550–59 (1994); Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism,
and the Interpretation of “This Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1186–259 (1987);
Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the Framers’ Intention, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 751, 756–60 (1987); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force
of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127–48 (2003); Gary
Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1833–36 (1997);
Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on
Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1278–
87 (1997); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the
Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 512–14 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia
v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 940–55 (2009); Saikrishna B. Prakash,
Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 541–45 (1998)
(reviewing RAKOVE, supra note 38).
40. Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of
Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 532 (2008).
41. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613
(1999). For accounts of the turn toward originalism among legal scholars, see, for example,
DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM
20–54 (2005); JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 101–216 (2005). This is not to say that admiration for originalism
is universal in the academy. For some of the more powerful attacks on the move toward
original public meaning, see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(2009); Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185; Larry
Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907 (2008).
42. James E. Ryan, Does It Take A Theory? Originalism, Active Liberty, and
Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1623, 1625 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA
(2005)).
43. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 659 (2009).
44. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
45. “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding
generation.46
Thus, constitutional adjudication should be based on an “examination of a variety
of legal and other sources to determine the public understanding of a legal text.”47
Accordingly, an originalist might dismiss efforts to determine the structure of
the free speech doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court as beside the point;
doctrine is properly dictated by the original meaning of the text itself: “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”48
Indeed, originalism seems to be gaining greater prominence in the Court’s
approach to free speech doctrine. In its recent decision in United States v. Stevens,49
for example, the Court characterized the doctrinal limitations on the scope of First
Amendment protection that it had recognized as consisting only of those categories
of speech that have been historically considered to be without legal protection.50
Thus, it may be that the key to First Amendment doctrine is to be found in history.
There has not yet been an assessment of the First Amendment’s Speech and
Press Clauses’ original public meaning in the scholarly literature. Indeed, it turns
out that the originalist approach to interpretation of the First Amendment is easier

46. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting United
States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
47. Id. at 2805 (emphasis in original). Justice Scalia, the author of the opinion in Heller,
is an avowed advocate of utilizing the original public meaning of the text in constitutional
adjudication. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38–41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
[hereinafter A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION].
48. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This might be overstating the irrelevance of doctrine,
however, even for originalists. It is true that some originalists largely reject nonoriginalist
precedent. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as
Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 262–69 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi, Text
vs. Precedent in Constitutional Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 947 (2008); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT.
289 (2005). But others are more sympathetic to nonoriginalist precedent, at least in some
circumstances. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare
Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1444–61 (2007); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 823–50 (2009); Henry
Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723,
739–72 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 47,
at 129, 138–40; Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare
Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
155, 195–96 (2006); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism,
Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 436–79 (2006).
49. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
50. Id. at 1584–86. The matter is complicated, however, by the Court’s
acknowledgement that new categories of unprotected speech, such as child pornography, can
be recognized when they are “intrinsically related” to unlawful conduct, id. at 1586, and the
Court’s willingness to leave open the possibility that some extreme depictions of animal
cruelty might be unprotected despite the lack of historical support for such regulation, id. at
1592.
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said than done. The historical evidence concerning the original meaning of the
Speech and Press Clauses is frustratingly inconclusive, but an inquiry into original
public meaning sheds at least some light on the character of the First Amendment.
A. The Framing-Era Meaning of the First Amendment
The framing-era conception of freedom of speech and the press was anything
but capacious, at least by contemporary standards. As Blackstone’s Commentaries
summarized the law:
[W]here blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or
scandalous libels are punished by the English law . . . the liberty of the
press, properly understood, is by no means infringed or violated. The
liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but
this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not
in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every
freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases
before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press:
but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must
take the consequences of his own temerity. . . . [T]o punish (as the law
does at present) any dangerous or offensive writings, which, when
published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious
tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of
government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty.
Thus the will of the individuals is still left free; the abuse only of that
free will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint
hereby laid upon freedom of thought or enquiry: liberty of private
sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad
sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which
society corrects.51
On this view, the concept of free expression was quite limited; the freedom of the
press consisted only of a prohibition against prior restraint without limitation on the
ability of the law to impose after-the-fact punishment on any expression thought to
be “of a pernicious tendency.” Blackstone’s account was enormously influential in
colonial-era American law, which largely accepted this view of the power to punish
expression thought to be harmful.52
Still the Blackstonian view was not uncontested. The problem with the
Blackstonian conception, after all, is that it offers little meaningful protection since
anything thought to be “of a pernicious tendency” may later lead to punishment.

51. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *151–52
(emphasis in original). For a helpful summary of English law prior to the framing of the First
Amendment, see 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.3 (4th ed. 2009).
52. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 767–68 (1953); LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE
PRESS 119–219 (1985); Thomas F. Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in the
Federalist Period; The Sedition Act, 18 MICH. L. REV. 615, 627–37 (1919–20).
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The rule against prior restraints precluded outright censorship, but a speaker
wishing to avoid jail might engage in self-censorship that could be no less effective
as a means of suppressing speech. This line of argument was not unknown in early
America; a number of Blackstonian critics advanced it in the founding era.53 This
view seems to have had some resonance among the public at large; the 1735
seditious libel prosecution of John Peter Zenger for publishing attacks on a colonial
governor resulted in an acquittal despite the judge’s refusal to instruct the jury that
truth was a defense to the charge.54 The Zenger prosecution, moreover, provoked
enormous criticism of the Blackstonian rule that truth was not a defense to libel
and, indeed, of the concept of seditious libel itself.55
As a practical matter, the Zenger trial seems to have led to the demise of
seditious libel in colonial America; the Zenger prosecution appears to have been the
last of its kind in the colonies.56 Moreover, as Lucas Powe has observed, although
there was no indication that the law of seditious libel was formally repudiated in
the years leading to the American Revolution, the prevalence of activity that
amounted to seditious libel under Blackstonian standards among the increasingly
rebellious colonists suggests that the concept of seditious libel may have been
something of a dead letter by the framing of the First Amendment.57 Still, the fact
that the colonists had little objection to seditious libel when directed at a colonial
government that they found increasingly oppressive did not mean that they would
reject the concept when it came to a constitutional government that they themselves
chose by free election. For such a government, established by a Constitution to
which the people themselves had agreed, perhaps the Blackstonian conception
would be thought appropriate.
The first ten amendments to the Constitution had their origins in the antiFederalist attacks on the original Constitution’s lack of a Bill of Rights, which
appears to have persuaded leading federalists that the addition of such protections
was a political necessity.58 Constitutional recognition of freedom of the press, and,

53. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16–22
(Harvard Univ. Press 1954) (1941); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S
DARLING PRIVILEGE” 30–51 (2000); JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN
AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 428–31 (1956); David A. Anderson,
The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 463–64, 486–94 (1983); William T.
Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 91, 109–14 (1984); David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on
Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795, 802–11 (1985)
(reviewing LEVY, supra note 52).
54. For a detailed account of the prosecution, see THE TRIAL OF PETER ZENGER (Vincent
Buranelli ed., 1957).
55. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Zenger Case: Prototype of a Political Trial, in
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 21, 36–42 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1981).
56. See Harold L. Nelson, Seditious Libel in Colonial America, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
160, 167–71 (1959). Indeed, during the debates over what became the Sedition Act of 1798,
Rep. Claiborne observed: “Prosecutions of this kind have very rarely happened; in some of
the States, a cause of this kind had never been tried.” 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2135 (1798).
57. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS IN AMERICA 28–50 (1991).
58. For helpful accounts, see ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO POWER: HOW
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to a lesser extent, freedom of speech, figured prominently in the debate over the
original Constitution; seven state ratifying conventions had proposed constitutional
amendments protecting freedom of the press, and four also proposed protection for
freedom of speech.59 Even so, the anti-Federalist arguments consisted of
generalized demands for protection of the freedom of the press, with virtually no
criticism of Blackstone’s view on the scope of that protection.60 As for freedom of
speech, anti-Federalists said virtually nothing about it.61 Indeed, at the time of the
original Constitution’s ratification, while the constitutions or laws of all thirteen
states protected freedom of the press, only Pennsylvania and Vermont offered
protection for freedom of speech as well.62 Perhaps more important, no state had
departed from Blackstone either by judicial decision or statute with respect to either
freedom of speech or the press.63
The original proposal for the First Amendment’s Speech and Press Clauses was
presented by James Madison to the First Congress in broad terms: “The people
shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their
sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty,
shall be inviolable.”64 Even if the proposal’s reference to “the freedom of the press”
were thought to be a reference to Blackstone’s description of that same concept, the
prior clause suggested broader protection, if only to avoid redundancy. Madison’s
language, however, did not survive. The House appointed a Committee of Eleven
to consider this and Madison’s other proposed constitutional amendments, and
although no records of its deliberations survive, what emerged from the committee
was something close to the final form of the Speech and Press Clauses: “The
freedom of speech, and of the press, and the right of the people peaceably to

JAMES MADISON USED THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE CONSTITUTION 57–95 (1997);
RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS 120–77
(2006); and Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity,
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 322–44.
59. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES AND ORIGINS
92–93 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS].
60. See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 52, at 220–56. For the original materials, see THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 97–115. The closest to any criticism of the
Blackstonian view is a complaint by Cincinnatus that the proposed constitution would permit
Congress to subject the press to criminal liability. See Reply to Wilson’s Speech:
“Cincinnatus” [Arthur Lee] I, reprinted in I THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 92, 93–95
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
61. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 61–63 (2008). One comprehensive collection of anti-Federalist material, for
example, contains only two passing references to freedom of speech, both from the Federal
Farmer. See Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government
Proposed by the Late Convention; and to Several Essential and Necessary Alterations in It.
In a Number of Letters from a Federal Farmer to the Republican, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 214, 245 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (letter IV); id. at 323, 329–30 (letter
XVI).
62. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 93–96.
63. See David Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious
Libel into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 154, 171–78 (2001).
64. Proposal by Madison in House, June 8, 1789, in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 59, at 83.
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assemble and consult for their common good, and to apply to the government for
redress of grievances, shall not be infringed.”65 The use of the definite article at the
beginning of this sentence hints at a reference to a preexisting legal concept, and
given the state of framing-era law, the most likely suspect is Blackstone. This
proposal passed the House with no discussion of the meaning of the Speech and
Press Clauses.66
At the time, the Senate met in secret and kept a journal reflecting its actions in
skeletal form.67 The only action pertinent to the Speech and Press Clauses that was
taken was to reject an amendment to qualify those clauses with the language, “[i]n
as ample a manner as hath at any time been secured by the common law.”68 The
Senate later added the “Congress shall make no law” formulation at the beginning
of the amendment and conjoined the proposal with clauses protecting the free
exercise of religion while prohibiting an establishment of religion.69 After a
conference committee agreed on the Senate version of the Speech and Press
Clauses,70 the proposed amendment passed both Houses and was sent to the states
for ratification without further substantive discussion of the Speech or Press
Clauses.71 No record survives of the debates in the ratifying states, or of the public
discussion of the proposed amendment.72
It is difficult to know what to make of these events. As we have seen, Madison’s
original draft seemed to lean away from Blackstone, but the Committee of Eleven’s
redraft seems to return closer to the traditional view. Still, the Senate seems to have
rejected a proposal to track the common law which, as we have seen, had never
repudiated Blackstone. That suggests that at least some in the Senate understood
the House’s formulation as potentially deviating from Blackstone—whether the
proposal was understood as more or less speech-protective, however, is unclear.
Yet, perhaps the Senate proposal was merely offered for clarification, and rejected
as unnecessary. Drawing inferences from the failure to adopt an amendment, after
all, is a perilous business.
Perhaps more important, because the public knew little of the Senate’s closed
deliberations, from the standpoint of original public meaning, what may have been
the Senate’s willingness to depart from the common law seems to have little

65. House Committee of Eleven Report, July 28, 1789, in THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 84.
66. See id. at 96–97.
67. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD,
1789–1801, at 10 & nn.27 & 29 (1997).
68. Further Senate Consideration, Sept. 3, 1789, in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 59, at 85.
69. Further Senate Consideration, Sept. 9, 1789, in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 59, at 86.
70. Conference Committee Report, Sept. 24, 1789, in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 59, at 89.
71. House Consideration of Conference Committee Report, Sept. 24 [25], 1789, in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 89; Senate Consideration of Conference
Committee Report, Sept. 24, 1789, in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 90–
91; Further Senate Consideration of Conference Committee Report, Sept. 25, 1789, in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 91–92.
72. See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 52, at 267; Anderson, supra note 53, at 486.
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interpretive significance. What may be more important from the standpoint of
original public meaning is that Blackstone’s conception of the freedom of press
seemed to have been something of a dead letter since the Zenger case. For that
reason, it is far from clear that the public would have understood the First
Amendment’s Speech and Press Clauses to have been Blackstonian in character.
Moreover, whatever the Senate’s reasons for rejecting the proposal that would have
had the First Amendment track the common law—presumably a matter of concern
to intentionalists but not for advocates of original public meaning—any textualist
should find it hard to disregard the difference between the Seventh Amendment,
which expressly references and preserves the common law right to a jury in civil
cases,73 and the First Amendment’s far more uncertain reference to prevailing
common law standards.74
Even more perplexing, especially from the standpoint of original public
meaning, is the First Amendment’s parallel protections for freedom of speech and
freedom of the press. Blackstone’s account, as we have seen, described “the liberty
of the press.”75 The First Amendment’s Press Clause might therefore be thought to
codify Blackstone’s account, but Blackstone did not describe “the freedom of
speech,” and it seems unlikely that this phrase had any generally accepted public
meaning in the framing era. As David Anderson observed, “freedom of speech,
unlike freedom of the press, had little history as an independent concept when the
first amendment was framed.”76 Perhaps the two clauses were meant to do no more
than apply the same legal regime to written and spoken words much as the law of

73. “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
74. David Anderson has drawn attention to the fact that the First Amendment’s text
contains no express qualification on the rights of free speech and a free press, unlike later
state constitutional provisions that added the Blackstonian qualification that the press is
responsible for the abuse of its freedom. See Anderson, supra note 53, at 488. It is hard to
put too much weight on this observation, however, since framing-era state constitutions
usually did not contain a similar qualification, and yet framing-era law followed Blackstone,
as we have seen. Still, one such qualifier appeared in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790.
See id. at 488 n.200.
75. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *151–52; see supra text accompanying note 51.
76. Anderson, supra note 53, at 487. The closest Blackstone came to describing “the
freedom of speech” is in the discussion of the rights of members of Parliament:
[I]t is declared by [statute] as one of the liberties of the people, “that the
freedom of speech, and debates, and proceedings in parliament, ought not to be
impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament.” And this
freedom of speech is particularly demanded of the king in person, by the
speaker of the house of commons, at the opening of every new parliament.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *160. This suggests an absolute protection, far different
than that ordinarily afforded to speech outside of Parliament. This concept is an unlikely
explanation for the First Amendment’s Speech Clause, since it already appeared as a
protection for Members of Congress in the original Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. As
we will see, in the framing era and in the nineteenth century, no one seemed to understand
the Speech Clause as providing the kind of absolute protection afforded legislators.
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defamation was divided into libel and slander, permitting civil or criminal liability
for either oral or written defamatory statements without allowing a defense of
truth.77 This explanation for the separate Speech and Press Clauses, however, is far
from clear. The concept of prior restraint had been used with respect to schemes for
licensing or enjoining the publication of written material, not mere “speech.”78
Thus, it is uncertain whether it would have made sense to anyone to protect speech
against prior restraint. If the Blackstonian rule against prior restraint had little
apparent application to “speech,” then the two-clause approach may have signaled a
departure from Blackstone.
What does come clear, however, is the nearly complete lack of discussion of any
alternative to the Blackstonian conception during the framing era. Even if the
Blackstonian view had been rejected, it is quite unclear what the public could have
understood had taken its place. Perhaps nothing except the sensibilities of
American juries had replaced Blackstone; Akhil Amar, for example, has argued
that the upshot of the Zenger acquittal was largely limited to a recognition that the
consequence of a rule forbidding prior restraints was that speech could not be
punished unless a jury could be persuaded to convict.79 But, on this view, the First
Amendment does little if any work not performed by the right to trial by jury. Some
might find an account of the original meaning of the Speech and Press Clauses that
pretty much drains them of independent meaning less than persuasive. In any event,
given the paucity of surviving evidence about how the First Amendment was
understood by the public during ratification, any inquiry into the original public
meaning of the Speech and Press Clauses seems awfully difficult to undertake.80
There is, however, one more source to consult.

77. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *123–25 (slander); 4 id. at *150–51 (libel).
Indeed, framing-era courts and commentators, although treating defamation actions as
subject to review under the First Amendment, nevertheless held defamation to be
unprotected. See Eugene Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original Meaning of the Freedom of
Speech, Press, and Petition, 96 IOWA L. REV. 249, 253–57 (2010).
78. Although the rule against prior restraints was understood in the framing era to forbid
both licensing requirements and injunctions against publication, this rule seems to have
arisen exclusively in cases involving the publication of written material. See Stephen A.
Siegel, Injunctions for Defamation, Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L.
REV. 655, 674–99 (2008).
79. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 23–
24 (1998).
80. David Lange and Jefferson Powell, while not claiming to have undertaken a
comprehensive analysis of the original public meaning of the First Amendment, have
pointed to a handful of framing-era statements that seem to reject Blackstone’s conception:
Alexander Hamilton’s comment in The Federalist opposing constitutional protection for
freedom of the press on the ground that its meaning was uncertain; an exchange of
correspondence between Chief Justice William Cushing of the Massachusetts Supreme Court
and John Adams suggesting that Massachusetts’s constitutional protection for “liberty of the
press” required recognition of a defense of truth in defamation actions; and a letter of John
Marshall, then in France in diplomatic negotiations, relying on the concept of freedom of the
press to reject French suggestions that his government should repress anti-French
publications as harmful to the public on the ground that such a suggestion was inconsistent
with American conceptions of a free press. See DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL,
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B. Original Meaning and the Debate over the Sedition Act
There is an additional basis for insight into the framing-era meaning of the First
Amendment—the events surrounding the Sedition Act of 1798.
The Sedition Act provided:
[I]f any person shall write, print, utter or publish, or shall cause or
procure to be written, printed, uttered or published, or shall knowingly
and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing
any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the
government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the
United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to
defame the said government, or either house of the said Congress, or
the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or
disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred
of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the
United States, or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, for
opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any act of the
President of the United States, done in pursuance of any such law, or of
the powers in him vested by the constitution of the United States, or to
resist, oppose, or defeat any such law or act, or to aid, encourage or
abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United States,
their people or government, then such person, being thereof convicted
before any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall
be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by
imprisonment not exceeding two years.81
On the one hand, the Act is notable for treating falsity as an aspect of seditious
libel. As we have seen, Blackstone did not recognize truth as a defense to
defamation;82 but, it seems that by 1798, undiluted Blackstonism was too much for

NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 203–
08 (2009). While this is useful evidence, only Hamilton’s statement was made in a public
forum, and one might conclude that Hamilton’s view was ultimately repudiated by the
ratification of the First Amendment. As for the others, it is unclear how to weigh the
importance of privately expressed sentiments as a matter of original public meaning when
they are uncorroborated by evidence that reflects the general public’s understanding. Even
more important, none of these statements provides clarity about what conception might have
been thought to have replaced Blackstone’s beyond the apparent willingness of Cushing and
Adams to recognize a defense of truth in defamation actions. Marshall’s letter was closest to
a general repudiation of the pernicious-tendency test in favor of something like absolute
protection, but Lange and Powell acknowledge that “Marshall was not engaged in
dispassionate constitutional analysis, and in addition he was writing under extreme time
pressure. As a consequence the exact constitutional implications of his discussion of press
freedom, a discussion which never explicitly invoked the First Amendment, are unclear.” Id.
at 207 (footnote omitted). One might add that from the standpoint of original public
meaning, the fact that there is so little evidence of a similar understanding of the First
Amendment to be found in the public record makes this evidence suspect.
81. An Act in Addition to the Act, Entitled “An Act for the Punishment of Certain
Crimes Against the United States,” ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596–97 (1798).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 51, 55.
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even the advocates of seditious libel to stomach.83 On the other hand, the Act did
pass, which might suggest that the First Amendment was understood to provide
little if any protection from after-the-fact punishment of expression beyond,
perhaps, a requirement that seditious libel be proven false—assuming that this was
understood to be a constitutional requirement and not a matter of legislative
grace.84 Indeed, the federal courts uniformly rejected First Amendment attacks on
the Sedition Act, relying on Blackstone’s conception, although the rulings came
from Federalist judges politically aligned with the sponsors of the Act.85
The Sedition Act provoked ferocious debate in and out of Congress. Supporters
relied on Blackstone for the proposition that individuals were always answerable
for seditious expression, while opponents, in addition to denying that the
Constitution delegated power to Congress to punish seditious libel, claimed that
inherent in a republican government was the right to criticize the government.86
Madison, in his Virginia Report, denounced Blackstone’s distinction between prior
restraints and after-the-fact punishment,87 and, although admitting his inability to
identify “the proper boundary between the liberty and licentiousness of the press,”88
Madison argued that representative governments “require a greater freedom of

83. The House agreed to an amendment making truth a defense without recorded debate.
8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2134 (1798). Indeed, section 3 of the Act seemed to make falsity an
element of the offense, and section 3 guaranteed the admissibility of evidence of truth: “[I]f
any person shall be prosecuted under this act, for the writing or publishing any libel
aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the defendant, upon trial of the cause, to give in evidence in
his defence, the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel.” § 3, 1
Stat. at 597. Even so, Justice Chase interpreted the Act to place a burden of establishing truth
“to the marrow” on the defendant. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 642–43 (C.C.D.
Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865).
84. The Act passed in the House by a vote of 44 to 41. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2171
(1798). The Act seems to have been less controversial in the Senate; although the Senate’s
debates were not recorded, the original version of the Act, without any defense of truth,
passed by a vote of 18 to 6. See S. JOURNAL, 5th Cong., 2d Sess. 527–28 (1798). The Senate
later agreed to the bill, as amended by the House, without recorded vote. See id. at 537–38.
85. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 61, at 86–89; GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:
FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 68–69 (2004); Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment
Right to Free Expression: From the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 794–95, 799–800 (2008); Jenkins, supra note 63, at 189–96.
86. See, e.g., WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 86–119 (1970); CURTIS, supra note 53, at 58–79, 94–100; FELDMAN, supra
note 61, at 80–86, 89–100; LANGE & POWELL, supra note 80, at 212–24; LEVY, supra note
52, at 297–324; SMITH, supra note 53, at 131–50; STONE, supra note 85, at 36–45; Jay, supra
note 85, at 794–99; Jenkins, supra note 63, at 171–83; Mayton, supra note 53, at 121–28;
Rabban, supra note 53, at 849–52. For a nearly contemporaneous account of the debate, see
2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES app. at 14–21 (1803). For
statements in the House debates expressing views of the First Amendment inconsistent with
Blackstone, see 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2140–45 (1798) (Rep. Nicholas); id. at 2153–54 (Rep.
Livingston); id. at 2160–61 (Rep. Gallatin). For statements in the House reflecting
Blackstone, see id. at 2148 (Rep. Otis); id. at 2168–70 (Rep. Harper).
87. JAMES MADISON, THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799–1800 (1800), excerpted in
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 197, 214 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966).
88. Id.
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animadversion than might be tolerated by the genius of such a government as that
of Great Britain.”89 The Act’s supporters had a rejoinder; one of the obligations of
citizenship in a republic, in their view, was to refrain from obstructing elected
officials in the discharge of their duties, and defamation was thought to involve a
breach of that obligation.90 To the extent that both sides of this debate can be said
to reflect their own understanding of the original meaning of the First Amendment,
it is not a stretch to say that this meaning was deeply contested.
As the Supreme Court later observed, after the Sedition Act expired following
the election of 1800, newly elected President Jefferson pardoned those convicted
under the Act and Congress later repaid the fines that had been imposed under it,
leading the Court to conclude that the judgment of history was against the
constitutionality of the Act.91 It may be doubted, however, if the election of 1800
can be fairly characterized as a referendum on the constitutionality of the Sedition
Act. More likely, the election turned on divisions within the ranks of the Federalists
having nothing to do with the Act.92 But even if the election of 1800 should be
understood as a repudiation of Blackstonism, it is difficult to determine what
conception of freedom of speech and of the press had replaced it.
As we have seen, Madison was unable to offer any clarity on the extent of the
right of free expression. This inability was not uncommon. For example, the author
of what the Supreme Court has called “the most important early American edition
of Blackstone’s Commentaries,”93 St. George Tucker, denounced Blackstone’s
view, agreeing with Madison that republican government required broader
protections, and yet he identified no clear boundary on First Amendment rights.94
Indeed, it is far from clear that Tucker believed that republican governments must
protect defamatory speech; Tucker approved of state-law remedies for defamation,
and regarded the effect of the First Amendment simply as leaving these remedies in
the hands of the states.95 Jefferson had a similar understanding.96 He even promoted

89. Id. at 215. For the classic judicial statement of the view that the republican form of
government established in America necessitated a broader conception of freedom of speech,
see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
90. James P. Martin, When Repression Is Democratic and Constitutional: The
Federalist Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 117,
169–76 (1999).
91. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1963). To similar effect, see
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
92. See, e.g., JAMES GRANT, JOHN ADAMS: PARTY OF ONE 421–27 (2005); DAVID
MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 536–52 (2001); 2 PAGE SMITH, JOHN ADAMS 1038–59 (1962).
93. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008). On the influence of
Tucker, see, for example, SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND
THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828, at 263–72 (1999); CRAIG EVAN
KLAFTER, REASON OVER PRECEDENTS: ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 38–47 (1993);
and Davison M. Douglas, Foreword: The Legacy of St. George Tucker, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1111 (2006).
94. See 2 TUCKER, supra note 86, at app. 11–14, 30.
95. See id. at app. 28–30.
96. Jefferson wrote:
Nor does the opinion of the unconstitutionality and consequent nullity of that
law [the Sedition Act] remove all restraint from the overwhelming torrent of
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seditious libel prosecutions of his opponents during his administration in state
courts, and in one instance even by means of a federal prosecution based on
common law principles.97 Thus, even if the Sedition Act controversy should be
regarded as evidence of the demise of the Blackstonian conception for free speech
and a free press for purposes of ascertaining the original public meaning of the First
Amendment, it again is far from clear what conception of the founding generation
had replaced it, other than perhaps the view that seditious libel should be left to the
states. Indeed, another early commentator, even while attacking the
constitutionality of the Sedition Act on the ground that it gave special rights to
particular public officials, expressed the view that the law of seditious libel was
consistent with the First Amendment.98
C. The First Amendment’s Meaning in the Reconstruction Era
It may be that the search for the First Amendment’s original meaning should not
be confined to framing-era evidence. In Heller, for example, in an effort to construe
the Second Amendment, the Court examined evidence of the public’s
understanding of the Second Amendment throughout the nineteenth century.99
Beyond that, the First Amendment became applicable to the states through the
slander which is confounding all vice and virtue, all truth and falsehood in the
US. The power to do that is fully possessed by the several state legislatures. It
was reserved to them, and was denied to the general government, by the
constitution according to our construction of it.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 1 THE ADAMSJEFFERSON LETTERS: THE COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND
ABIGAIL AND JOHN ADAMS 279 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959). For an elaboration on
Jefferson’s views, see LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER
SIDE 46–48 (1963). The same view was stated by opponents of the Sedition Act in the
House. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2152 (1798) (Rep. Macon); id. at 2153 (Rep. Livingston);
id. at 2163–64 (Rep. Gallatin).
97. See Paul Finkelman, Thomas Jefferson, Original Intent, and the Shaping of
American Law: Learning Constitutional Law from the Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 62
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45, 77–80 (2006). In the federal prosecution, the Supreme Court
eventually held that the federal courts have no common law power to punish crimes without
considering any question under the First Amendment. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 32 (1814).
98. See JAMES SULLIVAN, A DISSERTATION UPON THE CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 28–54 (1801). David Lange and Jefferson Powell
have argued that the Sedition Act controversy should be regarded as a rejection of balancing
in the First Amendment context because neither side of the debate spoke in terms of
balancing. See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 80, at 222–23. This account may afford too
much significance to a supposed omission; the failure of advocates of the Act to discuss
balancing may reflect no more than an understanding that, under the common law, the
balance had already been struck against speech amounting to seditious libel or otherwise
having a bad tendency. The opposition to the Act may not have rejected balancing either;
Tucker and Jefferson’s advocacy of state-law remedies as properly accommodating the
relevant governmental and societal interests suggests that the lack of discussion of balancing
on the part of opponents of the Act may instead reflect the view that the balance was one
appropriately struck by the states rather than the federal government.
99. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2804–12 (2008).
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Fourteenth Amendment,100 ratified in 1868.101 It may be that the public’s
understanding of the Speech and Press Clauses at the time they were made
applicable to the states is the appropriate point for assessing the meaning of the
Speech and Press Clauses on the view that 1868 was the time at which the nation
recommitted to constitutional protection for free speech and a free press.102 Indeed,
by 1868 there were signs of evolution in the public’s understanding of free speech
and a free press.
Early in the nineteenth century, Blackstonism seemed alive and well. Despite
the resolution of the Sedition Act controversy, the leading commentators in the first
half of the nineteenth century hewed to Blackstone, explaining that the First
Amendment preserved the common law and accordingly prohibited only prior
restraints.103 Justice Story, for example, wrote that the view that “this amendment
was intended to secure to every citizen an absolute right to speak, or write, or print,

100. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323–25 (1937), overruled on other grounds
by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). The question whether the Speech and Press
Clauses were properly incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment is a controversial one,
on which there is a vast literature. For some of the leading originalist defenses of
incorporation, see AMAR, supra note 79, at 163–239; 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 52, at 1089–
95; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 57–91, 215–20 (1986); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of
Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866–67, 68
OHIO ST. L.J. 1509 (2007). For some of the leading attacks on the historical case for
incorporation, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 155–89 (2d ed. 1997); DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND
INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 27–36 (2003); JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 228–39 (1965); Donald
Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down that
Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1574–82 (1996); Charles Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN.
L. REV. 5 (1949); Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth
Amendment: Original Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 361 (2009); George C. Thomas III, The Riddle of the Fourteenth Amendment:
A Response to Professor Wildenthal, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1627 (2007). For present purposes, it
is unnecessary to enter this debate. Given that the Supreme Court has concluded that the
First Amendment should be considered protected against the states by the Fourteenth, the
relevant question for the current project is whether evidence of the public’s understanding of
the First Amendment at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification aids in
understanding the meaning of the First Amendment’s Speech and Press Clauses.
101. See Proclamation No. 13, 15 Stat. 708, 710 (July 28, 1868).
102. See Siegel, supra note 78, at 658–63. Other scholars have advanced similar
arguments with respect to different provisions in the first eight amendments. See, e.g.,
AMAR, supra note 79, at 258–66 (Second Amendment); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption
of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1085, 1136–53 (1995) (First Amendment Establishment Clause); Michael B. Rappaport,
Originalism and Regulatory Takings: Why the Fifth Amendment May Not Protect Against
Regulatory Takings, but the Fourteenth Amendment May, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729, 743–
57 (2008) (Fifth Amendment Takings Clause).
103. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 12–22 (1827); 3 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 731–33 (1833).
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whatever he might please . . . is a supposition too wild to be indulged by any
rational man.”104 Rejecting the view that the Blackstonian position was inconsistent
with republican government, Story defended the criminalization of seditious libel
under state law,105 although he expressed no view about whether the federal
government could prohibit seditious libel.106
Still, prior to the Civil War, there were unmistakable signs of movement from
Blackstonism. Even Justice Story seems to have accepted that truth, at least in some
circumstances, could be a defense to libel; he called the First Amendment “neither
more nor less, than an expansion of the great doctrine, recently brought into
operation in the law of libel, that every man shall be at liberty to publish what is
true, with good motives and for justifiable ends.”107 Moreover, his agnosticism on
the constitutionality of the Sedition Act does not appear to reflect the prevailing
public understanding of the era; in 1840, Congress authorized the repayment of
fines levied under the Sedition Act108 on the ground that the Act was
unconstitutional.109 And, in the years leading to the Civil War and until the time of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s framing and ratification, there was increasing
criticism in the North of efforts by the southern states to suppress progressive
speech on the subject of race.110
Nevertheless, by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification,
developments in First Amendment jurisprudence had not been dramatic. In his
1873 revision of Kent’s Commentaries on American Law, Holmes had little to say
about the First Amendment other than to note a trend toward permitting truth as a
defense in defamation actions.111 As for the Sedition Act, the treatise described it as
“declaratory, and was intended to convey the sense of Congress, that in
prosecutions of that kind it was the common right of the defendant to give the truth
in evidence.”112 Throughout the nineteenth century, the bad-tendency test continued
to predominate in thinking about the First Amendment, although it was understood
to grant greater protection for expression on public affairs and matters of public
concern.113

104. 3 STORY, supra note 103, at 731–32. He also observed that “[t]he doctrine laid down
by Mr. Justice Blackstone, respecting the liberty of the press, has not been repudiated (so far
as is known) by any solemn decision of any of the state courts, in respect to their own
municipal jurisprudence.” Id. at 741.
105. Id. at 732–33, 738–43.
106. See id. at 743.
107. Id. at 732–33.
108. See, e.g., Act of July 4, 1840, ch. 45, 6 Stat. 802 (1840).
109. See CONG. GLOBE, 26TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 411 (1840).
110. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 79, at 234–42; CURTIS, supra note 53, at 241–99;
FELDMAN, supra note 61, at 121–52; Jay, supra note 85, at 805–10.
111. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *17–25 (O.W. Holmes, Jr.
ed., 1873).
112. Id. at *24 (emphasis in original).
113. See, e.g., DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 177–210
(1999).
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The leading treatise of the Reconstruction era was by Thomas Cooley, and the
Supreme Court in Heller accurately described it as “massively popular.”114 Cooley
unambiguously rejected the Blackstonian view of the First Amendment:
[T]he mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that is
secured by the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words to be
uttered orally there can be no previous censorship, and the liberty of the
press might be rendered a mockery and a delusion, and the phrase itself
a byword if, while every man was at liberty to publish what he pleased,
the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for harmless
publications.115
Cooley also objected to the common law of seditious libel as inconsistent with
republican government.116 Yet, Cooley characterized truth as a defense to libel only
“if published with good motives and for justifiable ends. Precisely what showing
shall establish good motives and justifiable occasion must be settled by future
decisions.”117 Indeed, Cooley seems to have thought that the First Amendment
protected expression only “so long as it is not harmful in its character, when tested
by such standards as the law affords.”118 Cooley seems to have believed that for
sufficient reason, the legislature could authorize additional restrictions for reasons
analogous to those thought sufficient to support liability under traditional common
law standards:
The constitutional freedom of speech and of the press must mean a
freedom as broad as existed when the constitution which guarantees it
was adopted, and it would not be in the power of the legislature to
restrict it, except in those cases of publications injurious to private
character, or public morals or safety, which come strictly within the
reasons of civil or criminal liability at the common law, but where,
nevertheless, the common law as we have adopted it failed to provide a
remedy. It certainly could not be said that freedom of speech was
violated by a law which should make imputing the want of chastity to a
female actionable without proof of special damage; for the charge is
one of grievous wrong, without any reason in public policy demanding
protection to the communication, and the case is strictly analogous to
many other cases where the common law made the party responsible

114. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2811 (2008). On the influence of
Cooley’s treatise, see, for example, EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT:
THE RISE, FLOWERING AND DECLINE OF A FAMOUS JURIDICAL CONCEPT 116–18 (1948);
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 628–29 (2d ed. 1985); CLYDE E.
JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. COOLEY,
CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
27–32 (1954); BENJAMIN R. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: HOW LAISSEZ FAIRE
CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 18–41 (1942).
115. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 421 (1868).
116. See id. at 426–29.
117. Id. at 464.
118. Id. at 422.
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for his false accusations. The constitutional provisions do not prevent
the modification of the common-law rules of liability for libels and
slanders, but they would not permit bringing new cases within those
rules when they do not rest upon the same reasons.119
The Fourteenth Amendment ushered in no great change in the protection that
state law offered for speech. For one thing, no discernable change in the scope of
protection afforded expression in defamation actions under state law followed the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, suggesting that the First Amendment
was not thought to have dramatic implications for state-law regulation of speech.120
For another, as late as 1907, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court
characterized the First Amendment as simply a rule against prior restraint,121
adding: “The preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the true; the
subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as to the false.”122 Yet, little
more than a decade later, the Court had repudiated its previous embrace of
Blackstone, in an opinion by the very same Justice Holmes.123 There seems to have
been more than a little uncertainty about the meaning of the First Amendment
throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century.
D. The Common Law of Free Speech
By now, it should be plain that the evidence regarding the original meaning of
the Speech and Press Clauses is anything but easy to sort out.
As we have seen, the First Amendment’s use of the definite article suggests that
the Speech and Press Clauses refer to a preexisting legal concept. The only wellrecognized framing-era account of the freedom of the press was Blackstone’s. Yet,
Blackstone’s account seemed never to take root in America, and, in any event, even
if an accurate account of the freedom of the press, may not have described the
freedom of speech. Moreover, the First Amendment’s reference to prevailing
common law standards is far more indirect than the Seventh Amendment’s.
The Sedition Act provided the first occasion in which there was serious public
debate about the meaning of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The
debate over the Act was intense; there was anything but a consensus about the
meaning of the First Amendment. Jefferson’s victory might be thought a rejection
of Blackstone, but it seems that neither he nor any other prominent critic of the
Sedition Act took seriously the notion that seditious libel was inconsistent with
republican government; and there was little evident disapproval of state-law
seditious libel prosecutions in the wake of Jefferson’s victory. Still, the trend
toward the recognition of truth as a defense to defamation in the nineteenth century
suggests that Blackstonian standards were never taken as authoritative, and if

119. Id. at 429–30.
120. See FELDMAN, supra note 61, at 150–79; Siegel, supra note 78, at 701–04. Professor
Siegel adds, however, that by Reconstruction, courts had become more reluctant to grant
injunctions against defamation. See id. at 705–26.
121. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
122. Id.
123. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919).
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Cooley’s treatise is any indication, seditious libel was under serious assault still by
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. Yet, as late as 1907, the
Supreme Court was repeating the Blackstonian formulation.
In the face of such deeply conflicting evidence, most scholars of the First
Amendment have despaired of producing any coherent originalist account of the
Speech and Press Clauses, at least when examining the question in terms of the
intentions of the framers.124 About the only originalist account to emerge came
from Robert Bork, who, despite admitting that “[t]he framers seem to have had no
coherent theory of free speech,”125 argued in these pages that “[c]onstitutional
protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political” and that
“within that category of speech we ordinarily call political, there should be no
constitutional obstruction to laws making criminal any speech that advocates
forcible overthrow of the government or the violation of any law.”126
At the time he advanced his proposal, then-Professor Bork thought that the only
legitimate methods of constitutional interpretation involved reliance on the
intentions of the framers or inferring rights from the structure of the government
established by the Constitution.127 The matter looks rather different from the
standpoint of original public meaning, however.128 As we have seen, no framing-

124. See, e.g., CHAFEE, supra note 53, at 16 (“The framers of the First Amendment make
it plain that they regarded freedom of speech as very important. . . . But they say very little
about its exact meaning.”); LEVY, supra note 37, at 209–10 (“At the time of the drafting and
ratification of the First Amendment, few among them [the framers] clearly understood what
they meant by the free press clause, and we cannot know that those few represented a
consensus.”); POWE, supra note 57, at 23 (“[I]t is simply impossible to turn to discussions by
the framers . . . for definitive answers on the scope of freedom of the press.”); STONE, supra
note 85, at 42 (“[T]he framers of the First Amendment . . . embraced a broad and largely
undefined constitutional principle, not a concrete, well-settled legal doctrine.”); DAVID A.
STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 52 (2010) (“[T]he actual views of the drafters and
ratifiers of the First Amendment are in many ways unclear.”); Lillian R. BeVier, The First
Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30
STAN. L. REV. 299, 307 (1978) (“History tells us little . . . about the precise meaning
contemplated by those who drafted the Bill of Rights.”). This is not to say that scholars have
found no value in originalist approaches to the First Amendment. Eugene Volokh, for
example, has advanced an originalist argument that symbolic speech was treated identically
to verbal or printed expression in framing-era law and on that basis has defended protection
for symbolic speech, such as flag burning. See Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the
Original Meaning of the First Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1063–83 (2009). Yet,
Professor Volokh acknowledges the limits of his inquiry; he admits that he cannot tell
whether flag burning or other particular forms of symbolic speech would have been treated
as protected in the framing era; and acknowledges that “[t]he original meaning of the First
Amendment is in many ways hard to determine.” Id. at 1083–84.
125. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 22 (1971).
126. Id. at 20.
127. See id. at 17–20.
128. Bork later adopted reliance on original public meaning as the proper approach to
constitutional adjudication, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143–51 (1990), yet he offered no evidence that his earlier
views on the First Amendment were consistent with its original meaning, see id. at 333–35.
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era source describes the freedom of the press or free speech in terms of political
speech that stops short of advocating violence. Blackstone ruled out prior restraints
in their totality—whether for political or nonpolitical writings—but thought
liability could be imposed after publication even for political speech if it was
defamatory or had some other “pernicious tendency.”129 Even though undiluted
Blackstonism may well be inconsistent with the original meaning of the First
Amendment, the bad-tendency test, as we have also seen, remained in vogue
throughout the nineteenth century, and it offered nothing like absolute protection
for political speech. Indeed, given the breadth of the bad-tendency test, it is
innocuous speech, not political speech, that offers the best case for protection under
framing-era standards. While there is some evidence that during the nineteenth
century the concept of seditious libel fell into disrepute, this is far from an
understanding of special constitutional protection for political speech.
In terms of original public meaning, Bork’s view that advocacy of illegal
conduct is without protection fares somewhat better—it seems a classic instance of
punishing speech with a “pernicious tendency” in the Blackstonian tradition.130 Yet,
Blackstone’s bad-tendency test is broad enough to sustain the Sedition Act itself—
defamatory criticism directed at public officials surely could produce contempt, if
not apathy, toward the political process of a type that might be thought undesirable
in a republic. Indeed, we have seen that the Sedition Act was defended on these
grounds.131 Still, whatever one thinks about the constitutionality of the Sedition Act
as an original matter, by the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
its consistency with the general understanding of free speech and a free press was
open to great doubt.
An originalist might argue that the evidence of the First Amendment’s
meaning—at least by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification—
suggests no more than protection for the type of political speech that amounted to
seditious libel, while otherwise preserving the bad-tendency test. This, after all,
pretty much describes Cooley’s account.132 But even this overstates things. After
all, truthful but defamatory speech might be thought to have a bad tendency—
Blackstone certainly thought it advisable to avoid the social friction that could
result from defamation of this character—yet the virtues and vices of at least some
types of bad-tendency speech seem to have been rebalanced between the era of
Blackstone and Cooley. Blackstone’s “pernicious tendency” test, after all, reflects a
balancing of competing interests; it is the “pernicious tendency” of defamatory and
other types of actionable speech that justified limiting “[e]very freeman[’s] . . .
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public.”133 Yet, by

129. See supra text accompanying note 51.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 51–52. For a helpful discussion of the
Blackstonian origins of the bad-tendency test, see RABBAN, supra note 113, at 132–37.
131. See supra text accompanying note 90.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 114–19.
133. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *151–52. David Lange and Jefferson Powell, in
contrast, use Blackstone to support First Amendment absolutism by arguing that his
approach was absolutist when it came to prior restraints, and therefore Blackstone should
today be understood to have endorsed a conception that condemns any regime that amounts
to a prohibition on what may lawfully be published. See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 80, at
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1868, not all expression with a “pernicious tendency” was beyond the scope of
permissible “freedom”—the emergence of the defense of truth in defamation
actions makes that clear.
Thus, the 1868 meaning of free speech and a free press was somewhat different
than protection for speech that had no “bad tendency”—or at least a stronger
showing of bad tendency had become required to overcome the speaker’s liberty
interests. Indeed, Cooley’s account quite explicitly recognized both the liberty
interest in speaking and writing free from liability, and the countervailing interests
that justified the imposition of liability, in some circumstances, for speech and
writings.134 Thus, the original meaning of the Speech and Press Clause reflected an
effort to identify the bounds of “freedom” in terms of an assessment of competing
interests.135 From 1791 to 1868, however, the balance between those competing
interests was not static. Indeed, the balance may have started moving as early as the
Zenger trial and seems to have been still evolving at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification, at least if Cooley’s uncertainty about the reach of the
defense of truth in defamation actions is any indication.136
Thus, the difficulties in identifying the original meaning of the First Amendment
are a function of the reality that the meaning of free speech and a free press was
something of a moving target in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The
common law meaning, at least of a free press, had been inherited from Blackstone’s
England, but that concept never really took root in America. From the Zenger trial
to the Sedition Act, there was a march away from Blackstone’s standards for free
speech and a free press in America—as the steady movement toward recognizing
truth as a defense demonstrates. That is not to say that the public meaning of free
speech and a free press was anything close to libertarian—the bad-tendency test
286–301. Yet, this understanding of Blackstone puts at naught all of the interests in
regulating speech that Blackstone thought could justify after-the-fact punishment. This
approach accordingly acknowledges the liberty interests recognized by Blackstone while
ignoring the regulatory interests also found in his account that justify after-the-fact
punishment. Equating Blackstone with First Amendment absolutism—at least outside of the
context of prior restraints on publication—accordingly has little grounding in the original
public meaning of the First Amendment which, as we have seen, accommodated any number
of regulatory interests that were thought to justify after-the-fact punishment of speech.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 114–19.
135. The first great academic champion of free speech, Zechariah Chafee, while stressing
the importance of free discussion in a republic, acknowledged the inevitability of balancing:
One of the most important purposes of society and government is the discovery
and spread of truth on subjects of general concern. This is possible only through
absolutely unlimited discussion, for . . . once force is thrown into the argument,
it becomes a matter of chance whether it is thrown on the false side or the true,
and truth loses all its natural advantage in the contest. Nevertheless, there are
other purposes of government, such as order, the training of the young,
protection against external aggression. Unlimited discussion sometimes
interferes with these purposes, which must then be balanced against freedom of
speech, but freedom of speech ought to weigh very heavily in the scale.
CHAFEE, supra note 53, at 31. On Chafee’s importance to the evolution of freedom of
speech, see MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF
CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 122–64 (1991).
136. See supra text accompanying note 117.
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was firmly established at the start of the twentieth century. Yet, it seems that even
the bad-tendency test never fully described the American conception of free speech
and a free press. Truthful but defamatory speech might have a bad tendency, yet
there was steady movement toward protecting it.
If the concepts of a free speech and a free press were in flux, this was nothing
unusual. As Bernadette Meyler has demonstrated, it was widely understood at the
time of the framing that the common law had a dynamic, evolutionary, and
frequently indeterminate character.137 In this respect, the law of free speech and a
free press was no exception. The evolving character of the balance between
competing interests embodied in the concepts of “freedom of speech” and a “free
press” meant that these concepts were understood to develop through the familiar
common law process of reasoned elaboration—the same process that had produced
significant changes in the law of defamation between the founding and 1868.
Indeed, when Justice Holmes opined in the Schenck case that First Amendment
protection turns on “whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent,”138 he was similarly
engaged in a kind of balance between speech and the government’s interest in
preventing “substantive evils.” By the time of his dissent in the Abrams case,
Holmes’s balancing was more overt, and it led him to frame the test in a more
demanding fashion:
But as against dangers peculiar to war, as against others, the principle
of the right to free speech is always the same. It is only the present
danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants
Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private
rights are not concerned.139
Since Abrams, the Court has continued to recalibrate the balance between liberty
and regulation and now requires an imminent threat of substantive evil to justify a
prohibition of speech thought to advocate unlawful conduct.140 Yet, long after the
Court stopped referring to the “bad tendency” of speech, First Amendment
jurisprudence continued to partake of balancing. The Court explained its evolution
from a doctrine that permitted the government to prohibit the advocacy of violent
conduct to one that permitted the state to prohibit advocacy of violence only when
directed toward producing imminent violent conduct on the ground that the former
poses a less serious threat: “[T]he mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety
or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as
preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.”141 Thus, a

137. See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV.
551, 580–600 (2006).
138. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
139. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
140. See supra text accompanying note 15.
141. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (per curiam) (quoting Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961) (ellipsis in original)). Melville Nimmer usefully
suggested a distinction between “definitional balancing,” which is used to determine which
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process of assessing the liberty interest in free speech against the extent of the
government’s interest in regulating the speech remains at the core of free speech
doctrine, even as the Court has come to demand more compelling governmental
interests to justify content-based government regulation. This doctrinal evolution
should be unsurprising; the value of free discussion and debate is surely more
evident in today’s America than in Blackstone’s England, and the dangers of
seditious speech more remote, producing a more speech-protective balance.142 But
once the original meaning of “the freedom of speech, and of the press” is
understood to involve a balance between liberty and order, a jurisprudence that
strikes that balance in light of the contemporary understanding of the relative
importance of the competing interests is consistent with even an originalist
understanding of the freedom of speech.
Indeed, no less an originalist than Robert Bork took just this view of the original
public meaning of constitutional text. Bork explained that it was irrelevant, in his
view, whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to outlaw
segregation inasmuch as the equality principle they placed in the text came to be
understood as inconsistent with segregation.143 In this approach to originalist
interpretation, Judge Bork is joined by many contemporary advocates of originalpublic-meaning originalism, who observe that because it is the original meaning of
constitutional text that is interpretively binding, not the intentions, motivations, or
understandings of those who crafted or agreed to that text, originalism permits the
categories of speech will be protected, and “ad hoc” balancing, which weighs the competing
interests of the litigants in the particular case. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak
from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy,
56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 941–48 (1968). A more recent survey of First Amendment law argues
that instead of dichotomizing balancing as did Professor Nimmer, balancing in First
Amendment jurisprudence should be understood to operate in three analytically distinct
fashions: when deciding whether a given activity qualifies as “speech” eligible for
constitutional protection; in classifying speech to determine the standard of scrutiny to be
applied when assessing regulation of that type of speech; and in determining whether the
speech will receive constitutional protection when the applicable standard of scrutiny is
applied. See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 384–98 (2009).
142. One scholar made the point this way:
[T]he distinction between opposition to a regime and opposition to policies or
leaders within a regime as the basis for a political party is so clear to us today
that Washington’s Farewell Address warning us “in the most solemn manner
against the baneful effects of the spirit of party” seems almost quaint.
Animadversion directed toward throwing the rascals out is now easier to
distinguish from animadversion directed toward overthrowing the regime, and
far easier to tolerate. And when this distinction is coupled with the realization
that the regime is in a sense the people themselves, the place for a doctrine of
seditious libel becomes more narrowly defined. Of course, the framers knew
these things in the abstract, but they had to be proved as historical facts—and
more significantly as historical possibilities—before they could supply a
knowledgeable foundation for the expansion of free speech.
Stanley C. Brubaker, Original Intent and Freedom of Speech and Press, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 82, 88–89 (Eugene W. Hickok,
Jr. ed., 1991).
143. See BORK, supra note 128, at 81–83.
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judge to apply principles embodied in constitutional text in light of contemporary
understandings as to how the constitutional principle is best applied, rather than
treating framing-era practice or understandings as to how text would be applied as
binding.144
Thus, even in originalist terms, most likely the best understanding of the Speech
and Press Clauses is that they were to create a common law of free speech and a
free press in which competing interests would be put to the balance, rather than
dictating particular outcomes to the process of balancing. In terms of original
meaning, in short, the purposivist account of the First Amendment is suspect.
Pragmatic balancing seems more consistent with the framing-era meaning of free
speech and a free press.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS
As we have seen, history suggests that the freedom of speech and of the press
can be understood as reflecting a balance between liberty and order—this is the
common law legacy of the bad-tendency test. On the purposivist account, however,
something has fundamentally changed in First Amendment jurisprudence. It is not
simply that we understand the balance between liberty and order differently today
than in the framing era; instead, the purposivist account contends that the
government’s motive has become central to First Amendment jurisprudence. On
the purposivist account, as we have seen, a sufficient likelihood of a governmental
motive to suppress disfavored speech is reason enough to invalidate a challenged
regulation.145
Although the purposivists have to date made no effort to square their position
with original meaning, originalism may well not be fatal to their account of First
Amendment doctrine. As we have seen, by the framing of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a consensus was emerging that seditious libel was inconsistent with
the First Amendment. Purposivists could argue that the hostility to seditious libel
was ultimately rooted in the view that government may not suppress disfavored
speech or speakers—the conceptual core of the purposivist account. On this view,
purposivism simply reflects the natural evolution of a principle anchored in the
original understanding of free speech, at least as of 1868. Thus, although, as we

144. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 427, 486–99 (2007); Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning
of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 591–617 (1998); Aileen Kavanagh, Original
Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional Interpretation, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 255, 279–83
(2002); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 395, 410–43 (1995); Note, Original Meaning and Its Limits, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1279, 1292–1300 (2007). The Court took something of this approach in Heller, for example,
when it acknowledged that citizens cannot keep heavy weapons “useful against modern-day
bombers and tanks,” and for that reason, that the Second Amendment could no longer serve
the function intended by the framers of ensuring that a citizen militia can operate as an
effective military force, yet the Court concluded that it is the textual recognition of the right
to bear arms, not the framers’ intentions or motivation for recognizing that right, that are
interpretively binding. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 (2008).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 4–5.
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have seen, there is a strong case to be made that a First Amendment jurisprudence
that abjures balancing is inconsistent with original meaning; this objection may not
be sufficient to doom the purposivist enterprise. The matter is surely not free from
doubt; in the recent Stevens decision, for example, the Court denied that First
Amendment protection “extend[s] only to categories of speech that survive an ad
hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”146 If the Court is correct that
First Amendment jurisprudence reflects a categorical approach rather than
balancing, then the purposivists may be onto something.
To assess the purposivist theory of the First Amendment, accordingly, a test
case is in order. After all, in science, a theory gains acceptance if it makes testable
predictions that are later borne out.147 We should expect no less from theories about
legal doctrine. The relationship between the First Amendment and the
government’s power to investigate potential lawbreaking provides just the kind of
test case needed to assess the purposivists’ claims.
A. The Problem of First Amendment Investigations
Robert Watts was convicted of threatening the life of the President for saying at
a public rally, “I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got
to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”148 The Court
reversed his conviction, explaining that “a statute . . . which makes criminal a form
of pure speech, must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment
clearly in mind. What is a threat must be distinguished from what is
constitutionally protected speech.”149 Watts has come to stand for the proposition
that even speech that is reasonably understood to convey a threat retains
constitutional protection unless it goes beyond the bounds of rhetorical hyperbole
and reflects a serious intention to commit an act of unlawful violence.150 Absent
this kind of “true threat,” speech advocating unlawful conduct or violence is
protected unless a breach of the peace is imminent.151
Thus, under the First Amendment, Watts could not be punished for what he said
about the President. To be sure, Watts’s statement was not in the highest tradition
of public discussion and debate, but as the Court observed, “[t]he language of the
political arena . . . is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact.”152 Still, sometimes
vituperative and abusive rhetoric is merely hyperbolic or inexact, but sometimes it
may betray the speaker’s intention to break the law. Had Watts subsequently killed
the President, it is plain that his earlier statement, even though constitutionally
protected when made, could be used as evidence of his criminal intent.153 Without

146. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).
147. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
148. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (per curiam).
149. Id. at 707.
150. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003); Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378, 386–87 (1987).
151. See supra text accompanying note 15.
152. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
153. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006)

34

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:1

the benefit of hindsight, however, it is impossible to know whether Watts was
being hyperbolic.
Accordingly, a question unanswered by Watts is whether Watts’s statement,
though in itself protected by the First Amendment, could be the trigger for an
investigation to determine whether Watts posed a genuine threat to the President.154
Could Watts’s statement, at a minimum, be placed in a law-enforcement database
so that, if a serious attempt were subsequently made on the life of the President, his
statement could be used as an investigative lead? Judge Posner, for one, thinks he
knows the answer: “The FBI always has investigated people who advocate or
threaten to commit serious violations of federal law, even if the violations are not
imminent; and it always will.”155 As examples, he hypothesized “a new sect of
religious fanatics [that] announced that unless Chicagoans renounce their sinful
ways it may become necessary to poison the city’s water supply, or a newly
organized group of white supremacists [that] vowed to take revenge on Chicago for
electing a black mayor,” or “the leaders of a newly formed organization of Puerto
Rican separatists [that] went around Chicago making speeches to the effect that, if
the United States does not grant Puerto Rico independence soon, it will be
necessary to begin terrorist activities on the mainland United States.”156 None of
these instances of speech could be criminalized, but all of them, Judge Posner
opined, warrant investigation so as not to “trifl[e] with the public safety.”157
Judge Posner’s examples identify the kind of statements that, though
constitutionally protected, seem to merit some inquiry to determine if the speakers
are likely to cross the line into criminal conspiracy. The justification for
investigating constitutionally protected activity, however, is not based wholly on
hypotheticals. In early January 2000, two of the participants in the September 11
terrorist attacks, Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid el Mihdhar, were surveilled by
intelligence agents in Kuala Lumpur, where intercepted communications had
indicated that a meeting of an “operational cadre” of terrorists was to take place.158
(quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)) (“[I]t has never
been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct
illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means
of language, either spoken, written, or printed.”).
154. Indeed, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), suggests that
sometimes the question whether speech was protected will turn on subsequent events:
The lengthy addresses [on which damages liability had been premised]
generally contained an impassioned plea for black citizens to unify, to support
and respect each other, and to realize the political and economic power
available to them. In the course of those pleas, strong language was used. If that
language had been followed by acts of violence, a substantial question would
be presented whether Evers could be held liable for the consequences of that
unlawful conduct.
Id. at 928.
155. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1002, 1014–15 (7th Cir.
1984) (en banc).
156. Id. at 1014.
157. Id.
158. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
THE UNITED STATES 181 (2004).
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On January 8, surveillance teams reported that three suspected participants in the
meetings had left Kuala Lumpur for Bangkok, including Mihdhar and another
individual identified as “Alhazmi.”159 Several weeks later, CIA agents learned that
on January 15, Hazmi had left Bangkok for Los Angeles.160 In fact, Hazmi and
Mihdhar flew to Los Angeles together on that date.161 After they arrived in Los
Angeles, Hazmi and Mihdhar spent time at the King Fahd Mosque in Culver City,
one of the most prominent mosques in Southern California, where they made a
number of acquaintances.162 They may have been aided by an imam at the mosque,
Fahad al Thumairy, who was well known for his adherence to a radical
fundamentalist ideology.163 Had counterterrorism agents commenced surveilling al
Thumairy or the mosque after learning that suspected terrorists who might find the
mosque or its imam ideologically congenial had arrived in Los Angeles, they might
well have located the terrorists long before the attack, perhaps preventing it.164 But,
of course, such an investigation would have been triggered by al Thumairy’s
statements reflecting his sympathy with radical fundamentalist ideology, which are
protected by the First Amendment.
Politically motivated terrorism provides a particularly vivid example of the case
for intelligence-gathering investigations predicated upon expression that is
protected by the First Amendment. Obtaining intelligence about impending attacks
is critical, as the threat from terrorists who are willing to give their lives has made
conventional forms of deterrence through after-the-fact punishment largely
ineffective.165 Indeed, since the September 11 attacks, the FBI has engaged in
surveillance of mosques as part of its counterterrorism efforts.166
Yet another example involves Scott Roeder, the convicted killer of Dr. George
Tiller, a provider of late-term abortions.167 Several years earlier, Roeder had posted
on the website of an antiabortion group a rather chilling admonition: “Tiller is the
concentration camp ‘Mengele’ of our day and needs to be stopped before he and
those who protect him bring judgment upon on our nation.”168 Roeder’s posting
likely enjoyed First Amendment protection; it seems to fall short of a true threat or

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 181–82.
162. Id. at 216.
163. Id. at 216–17.
164. When Hazmi and Mihdhar moved to the San Diego area in February, they
frequented the Islamic Center of San Diego and a number of other area mosques, where they
made many acquaintances. Id. at 219–21. During their stay in San Diego, they contacted a
number of flight instructors seeking to learn how to fly Boeing jets, which struck at least one
instructor whom they consulted as indicating that they were either “joking or dreaming.” Id.
at 222.
165. See, e.g., GREGORY F. TREVERTON, RAND CORP., INTELLIGENCE FOR AN AGE OF
TERROR 36–39 (2009).
166. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and
Infiltration of Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1228–31 (2004).
167. See Monica Davey, Abortion Foe Is Found Guilty of First-Degree Murder in
Doctor’s Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A12.
168. Susan Saulny & Monica Davey, Seeking Clues on Suspect in Shooting of Doctor,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2009, at A1, A14.
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a call to imminent violence. Still, had the posting led investigators to interview
Roeder, perhaps he would have been deterred. At a minimum, had the posting been
monitored by law-enforcement officials and placed in an investigative file, it would
have been useful as an investigative lead after the shooting.
The justification for collecting information about activities protected by the First
Amendment, however, extends to cases far more prosaic than the plots of
international terrorists or the murder of abortion providers. Consider a police
department that wishes to videotape public demonstrations in order to improve
training and tactics, to deter police misconduct or document it if it occurs, and to
guard against false claims of police misconduct as well.169 Videotaping under these
circumstances involves collecting information about activities that are protected by
the First Amendment since the videotaping will necessarily reflect the protected
activities of demonstrators.
For its part, the U.S. Department of Justice takes the position that it is free to
undertake investigations on the basis of expression that enjoys First Amendment
protection. The guidelines governing the FBI’s initiation of federal criminal
investigations provide:
A full investigation of a group or organization may be initiated . . . if
there is an articulable factual basis for the investigation that reasonably
indicates that the group or organization may have engaged or may be
engaged in, or may have or may be engaged in planning or preparation
or provision of support for . . . furthering political or social goals
wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a
violation of federal criminal law . . . .170
This standard is well short of the requirement of imminent unlawful conduct or a
true threat that lacks constitutional protection; indeed, the FBI has opined:
Despite the high standard for prohibiting free speech or punishing those
who engage in it, the law does not preclude FBI employees from
observing and collecting any of the forms of protected speech and
considering its content—as long as those activities are done for a valid

169. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295,
2000 WL 709485, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2000) (declining to answer similar questions due
to lack of ripeness).
170. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS 23 (Sept. 29, 2008). The guidelines add: “These
Guidelines do not authorize investigating or collecting or maintaining information on United
States persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First
Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.” Id. at 13. Accordingly, it appears that as long as there is some lawenforcement justification for an investigation, it is permitted even if it involves monitoring
activities otherwise protected by the First Amendment. These guidelines represent an
incremental relaxation of the standard for initiating an investigation. For a discussion of the
evolution of the guidelines governing FBI investigations, see Allison Jones, Note, The 2008
FBI Guidelines: Contradiction of Original Purpose, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 137, 139–50,
164–69 (2009).
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law enforcement or national security purpose and conducted in a
manner that does not unduly infringe upon the ability of the speaker to
deliver his or her message.171
Nevertheless, history reflects a serious risk of abuse in investigations based on
the protected speech of the targets. In 1936, President Roosevelt first authorized the
FBI to operate a domestic intelligence-gathering program targeting what were
thought to be subversive activities.172 The resulting program was wildly overbroad,
investigating a wide variety of political activity with little apparent relationship to
illegal activity, such as a decades-long investigation of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, and investigations of then-Senator Adlai
Stevenson III, then-Representative Abner Mikva, and a host of critics of the FBI
itself.173 Indeed, groups and individuals were often targeted for investigation based

171. FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE 26
(Dec. 16, 2008). The Department of Justice has, however, placed some additional restrictions
on the collection and dissemination of information about activity that is protected by the
First Amendment. The regulations governing federally funded intelligence gathering under
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act provide that a law-enforcement agency
“shall collect and maintain criminal intelligence information concerning an individual only if
there is reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal conduct or activity
and the information is relevant to the criminal conduct or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 23.20(a)
(2009). The regulations also provide that an agency
shall not collect or maintain criminal intelligence information about the
political, religious, or social views, associations, or activities of any individual
or any group, association, corporation, business partnership, or other
organization unless such information directly relates to criminal conduct or
activity and there is reasonable suspicion that the subject of the information is
or may be involved in criminal conduct or activity.
Id. § 23.20(b). “Reasonable suspicion” is defined as “a basis to believe that there is a
reasonable possibility that an individual or organization is involved in a definable criminal
activity or enterprise.” Id. § 23.20(c). These regulations, however, appear to be based on a
concern about the dissemination of information rather than its collection. In response to a
comment that the reasonable-suspicion standard was unwarranted and that information need
only be “necessary and relevant to an agency’s lawful purpose,” the Department of Justice
“agreed that [while] the standard suggested is appropriate for investigative or other
information files maintained for use by or within an agency, the potential for national
dissemination of information in intelligence information systems, coupled with the lack of
access by subjects to challenge the information, justifies the reasonable suspicion standard.”
Final Revision to the Office of Justice Programs, Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating
Policies, 58 Fed. Reg. 48448, 48451 (Sept. 16, 1993) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 23). For
a helpful summary of the department’s policies regarding investigative activities and the
First Amendment, see OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF
THE FBI’S INVESTIGATIONS OF CERTAIN DOMESTIC ADVOCACY GROUPS 5–23 (Sept. 2010).
172. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES,
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: 1976 U.S. SENATE REPORT ON
ILLEGAL WIRETAPS AND DOMESTIC SPYING BY THE FBI, CIA AND NSA 25 (Red & Black
Publishers 2007) (1976).
173. Id. at 12–14.
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on little more than their ideological sympathies.174 The program included efforts to
prevent individuals from joining left-wing organizations or participating in protest
activities, by means such as sending letters rife with false allegations to the
employers and spouses of protesters.175 Efforts were made as well to intimidate Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. by sending him a recording of an adulterous tryst in his
motel room in an implicit threat to destroy his marriage.176 Undercover agents
infiltrated a variety of left-wing groups,177 and infiltrators made a special effort to
disrupt the protest activities of leftist groups during the Vietnam War.178 For
example, agents posing as protest organizers sent false instructions to protesters
about planned events in an effort to produce chaos.179
In response to civil rights and Vietnam protests, local police departments also
participated in efforts to discredit the protesters as communists.180 Protests were
photographed or filmed,181 and the resulting pictures—accompanied by charges that
the participants were subversives—were then provided to the House Internal
Security Committee.182 Photography and surveillance were conducted in an overt
fashion in an effort to intimidate protesters.183 Undercover infiltrators encouraged
leftist groups to engage in illegal activities in the hope of discrediting them and
developing a pretext for arrests.184 Information of dubious reliability was leaked
labeling protesters as communists or subversives.185 Since the September 11
attacks, some of these tactics seem to have reemerged, as investigations have been
launched targeting groups for no apparent reason other than their involvement in
antiwar activities.186

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See id. at 39–46, 52–62.
See id. at 14.
See id. at 15.
Id. at 125–27.
See id. at 66–67.
See id. at 13–14.
See FRANK DONNER, PROTECTORS OF PRIVILEGE: RED SQUADS AND POLICE
REPRESSION IN URBAN AMERICA 65–67, 69–76 (1990).
181. See id. at 67–69.
182. Id. at 73–74.
183. See id. at 107, 162–65, 202–04, 260–61.
184. See id. at 111–12, 129–30, 164, 169, 173–80, 256.
185. See id. at 93–96, 138–41.
186. See, e.g., ATHAN THEOHARIS, THE QUEST FOR ABSOLUTE SECURITY: THE FAILED
RELATIONS AMONG U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 253–58 (2007); see also Eric Lichtblau,
Documents Reveal Scope of U.S. Database on Antiwar Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2006,
at A18 (“A department spokesman said Thursday that the ‘questionable data collection’ [of
antiwar demonstrators] had led to a tightening of military procedures to ensure that only
information relevant to terrorism and other threats was collected.”); cf. Charlie Savage &
Scott Shane, Intelligence Was Improperly Collected on American Citizens, Documents Show,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, at A29 (describing the release of documents concerning “cases
in the last several years in which the [Department of Homeland Security’s] intelligence
office improperly collected information about American citizens or lawful United States
residents”). In a recent report concerning FBI investigations of certain domestic groups
engaged in activities protected by the First Amendment, the Department of Justice’s
Inspector General concluded that although the FBI had not targeted these groups because of
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Lower courts have been anything but uniform in their approach to First
Amendment claims attacking investigations that are based on the protected
expression of the targets.187 Most courts have held that such investigations require
their protected activities, some of the investigations were based on weak predication and
involved unwarranted investigative tactics or were unreasonably prolonged. See OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 171, at 186–88.
187. One might expect other constitutional provisions to come into play when it comes to
constitutional regulation of investigations directed at expressive activities protected by the
First Amendment—most obviously, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Indeed, one line of cases holds that warrants
authorizing the seizure of materials that enjoy First Amendment protection must adequately
circumscribe the discretion of officers who execute the warrant in order to minimize the risk
that a search or seizure will burden First Amendment rights. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
476, 485–86 (1965) (warrant authorizing seizure of records relating to Communist Party);
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731–33 (1961) (warrant authorizing seizure of
obscene materials). The Court has also held that the seizure of alleged obscene materials (to
prevent their dissemination on the basis of probable cause) violates the Fourth Amendment
because such a seizure prevents dissemination of materials not yet adjudicated obscene. See
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 62–67 (1989). These cases, however, have
produced no general set of regulations governing search and seizure of expressive material;
the Court also held that applications and warrants to search for and seize expressive
materials for evidentiary purposes are governed by ordinary Fourth Amendment standards.
See New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 873–75 (1986) (warrant to seize obscene
materials); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563–67 (1978) (warrant to search
newspaper for photos documenting illegal conduct at a demonstration).
The most important hurdle to Fourth Amendment regulation, however, is that most
investigative conduct does not amount to a “search” or “seizure” subject to regulation under
the Fourth Amendment. For example, an interview of the target of an investigation is not
subject to Fourth Amendment regulation as long as the target’s freedom to leave or
otherwise terminate the encounter is not circumscribed. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton,
536 U.S. 194, 200–06 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434–37 (1991). Nor is the
Fourth Amendment implicated by surveillance of a suspect in public places even if enhanced
by technological means. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448–50 (1989); United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282–85 (1983). Undercover officers are not engaged in a
search or seizure when they interact with targets, even by accepting an invitation into a
target’s residence or place of business, and even if they record their conversations. See
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748–54 (1971) (plurality opinion); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 438–39 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749–51, 753–
54 (1952). This rule is applicable even when undercover officers are investigating expressive
activities such as the distribution of books or films. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463,
467–71 (1985). Nor is the Fourth Amendment implicated when investigators acquire
information from third parties about the activities of the target; the Court reasons that there is
no expectation of privacy with respect to information one discloses to third parties. See SEC
v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743
(1976); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). Some lower courts have
recognized a constitutional right to privacy under the Due Process Clause that restricts the
government’s ability to require individuals to disclose sensitive personal information without
adequate justification, see, e.g., Nelson v. NASA, 530 F.3d 865, 877–81 (9th Cir. 2008),
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (No. 09-530), a rule that produces some regulation. But
this doctrine places no limitations on the government’s ability to acquire such information
from investigative targets voluntarily or from third parties.
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no more than a good-faith or rational law-enforcement interest supporting the
investigation,188 while a handful have imposed various formulations of strict
scrutiny on such investigations because of what is thought to be their chilling effect
on the exercise of First Amendment rights.189 Most scholars to address the issue
have argued for some form of heightened judicial scrutiny of such First
Amendment investigations because of their ability to chill the exercise of First
Amendment rights.190

188. See United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 748 (9th Cir. 2007); Anderson v. Davila,
125 F.3d 148, 160–63 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 696–705 (9th
Cir. 1989); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1014–16 (7th Cir.
1984) (en banc); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593
F.2d 1030, 1040–63 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wilkey, J.); id. at 1071–72 (Robinson, J., concurring
in the judgment); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 510 F.2d 253, 256–57 (2d Cir.
1974) (per curiam); see also Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2007)
(holding that detention and search of citizens reentering the country after attending a
conference on Islam abroad was not an impermissible burden on First Amendment
associational rights in light of intelligence suggesting that the conference might have
involved terrorists); cf. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 800–02
(7th Cir. 2001) (opining that the First Amendment imposes no requirement that
investigations of protected activities be based on reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct);
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 342–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (following
Alliance). The reader should know that the author represented the City of Chicago in the
2001 Alliance case.
189. See Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (strict
scrutiny); Local 491, Int’l Bhd. of Police Officers v. Gwinnett County, 510 F. Supp. 2d
1271, 1293–96 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (substantial relevance); Words of Faith Fellowship, Inc. v.
Rutherford County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 329 F. Supp. 2d 675, 688–89 (W.D.N.C. 2004)
(requiring content neutrality and narrow tailoring); Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United
States, 752 F. Supp. 1505, 1513–16 (D. Ariz. 1990) (strict scrutiny); White v. Davis, 533
P.2d 222, 228–32 (Cal. 1975) (same); see also Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 506–11
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (exercising judicial review of National Security Letters that required
disclosure of electronic communication transaction records), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 418 (2d Cir. 2006); Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of
Thornton, 44 P.2d 1044, 1059 (Colo. 2002) (adversarial hearing required prior to execution
of warrant to search bookstore) (applying Colorado Constitution).
190. See, e.g., Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling,
Surveillance, and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 646–55 (2004); Matthew
Lynch, Closing the Orwellian Loophole: The Present Constitutionality of Big Brother and
the Potential for a First Amendment Cure, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 234, 288–99 (2007);
Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112,
142–75 (2007); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World:
First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 786–97
(2008). Tom Lininger has also expressed similar concerns with respect to investigations of
religious groups based on their beliefs and religious activities. See Lininger, supra note 166,
at 1232–37. Without quite taking a position on the issue, Eugene Volokh has expressed
skepticism that the potential chilling effect of investigations on First Amendment activities is
a sufficient reason for circumscribing them. See Eugene Volokh, Deterring Speech: When Is
It “McCarthyism”? When Is It Proper?, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1413, 1442–49 (2005). Judge
Posner, unsurprisingly, takes a clear position, arguing that the costs of terrorism and other
serious crimes justify granting the government broad leeway to engage in intelligence
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Whether the government can undertake an investigation based on the protected
speech of the investigative target presents a classic case, on the purposivist account,
for strict scrutiny. As we have seen, for the purposivists, when the government is
free to impose special burdens on disfavored speech or speakers, the case for strict
scrutiny is clearest.191 The chilling effect of being targeted for investigation is
surely the kind of special burden that the purposivist account argues cannot be
placed on disfavored speech or speakers. To be sure, a purposivist could claim that
there is little risk of improper motivation when the government merely investigates
to determine whether there has been a violation of a generally applicable law, but
history suggests that such a claim would be unrealistic. Indeed, we will see that
First Amendment doctrine recognizes the type of chilling effect at stake in the First
Amendment investigation as legally cognizable. Thus, absent a regime that places
meaningful limits on the ability of investigators to target disfavored speech or
speakers, the purposivist account requires strict judicial scrutiny of First
Amendment investigations. Strict scrutiny, in turn, is a demanding test, requiring
that the government demonstrate that its challenged conduct advances a compelling
governmental interest through the least restrictive means.192 Thus, the First
Amendment investigation presents a good test of the purposivist account; this is
one area in which the difference between the purposivists and the pragmatists is far
more than academic.193
B. The Doctrinal Basis for Assessing First Amendment
Investigations Through Balancing
In Wayte v. United States,194 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality
of the federal government’s “passive enforcement” policy targeting for prosecution
only those individuals who had advised the Selective Service of their failure to
register for the draft.195 The Court concluded that the policy involved no
impermissible discrimination against those who protested the registration
requirement—and therefore did not violate the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause—reasoning that “[e]ven if the passive
policy had a discriminatory effect, petitioner has not shown that the Government
intended such a result. . . . [P]etitioner has not shown that the Government
gathering even though it may burden activities protected by the First Amendment. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 301–02 (2003); RICHARD A.
POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, at
182–96 (2005).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 8–9.
192. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). For an elaboration of the character of strict scrutiny in First
Amendment jurisprudence, see 1 SMOLLA, supra note 2, §§ 4:2–:26; Volokh, supra note 22,
at 2418–24.
193. The present discussion is limited to investigations occurring within the United
States. More complicated issues arise with respect to the extraterritorial reach of the First
Amendment. See generally Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free
Speech at—and Beyond—Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1579–98 (2010).
194. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
195. Id. at 600–03.
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prosecuted him because of his protest activities.”196 The Court also rejected a First
Amendment defense on the ground that the passive enforcement policy imposed
only an incidental burden on speech that was justified by the government’s interest
in enforcing the draft laws in a manner that “promoted prosecutorial efficiency,”
utilized “strong, perhaps conclusive evidence of the nonregistrant’s intent not to
comply,” and was “an effective way to promote general deterrence, especially since
failing to proceed against publicly known offenders would encourage others to
violate the law.”197
At first blush, Wayte seems inconsistent with the purposivist account of First
Amendment doctrine. After all, any investigation of draft protesters involves a risk
that the government will be especially keen to use its prosecutorial power to still
the voices of especially disfavored speakers. Yet in Wayte, the Court imposed no
form of heightened scrutiny to minimize the risk of an impermissible motive.198
Wayte seems to hold that as long as the government can identify some noncensorial reasoning for launching an investigation triggered by the target’s speech,
the First Amendment imposes no restraints on such investigations—regardless of
their potential for chilling protected expression. Surveillance of a mosque known
for the radical views of its clergy and congregants, for example, would easily pass
the Wayte test because the government could claim that its purpose was to identify
suspected terrorists, not to chill the expression of radical Islamist views.199

196. Id. at 610 (emphasis in original).
197. Id. at 612–13.
198. Indeed, one advocate of purposivism, Geoffrey Stone, acknowledges that Wayte
applies an undemanding form of scrutiny to prosecutive decisions. See Stone, supra note 2,
at 50–51 & nn.18–19.
199. For a discussion along these lines of First Amendment objections to the use of
National Security Letters requiring the production of potentially sensitive or confidential
information about activities protected by the First Amendment in terrorist investigations, see
Patrick G. Garlinger, Note, Privacy, Free Speech, and the Patriot Act: First and Fourth
Amendment Limits on National Security Letters, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1105, 1133–35 (2009).
Similar reasoning would defeat an effort at erecting a defense under the First Amendment’s
protection for the free exercise of religion for investigations triggered by or directed at
religiously motivated activities. Neutral laws of general applicability survive attack under the
Free Exercise Clause even if they burden religious belief. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 879, 890 (1990). A law lacks neutrality when it disadvantages conduct because it is
religiously motivated, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 532, 540–41 (1993), and it lacks general applicability when it imposes burdens
only on conduct motivated by religious belief, id. at 543. One might question whether an
investigation targeting a specific religious group on the basis of its religiously motivated
practices or beliefs is a burden of general applicability, but the burden is traceable to a law of
general applicability, and the Court has characterized investigations undertaken to determine
if an otherwise generally applicable law has been violated as a burden stemming from a
generally applicable law. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682–91 (1972).
Investigations undertaken to identify potential terrorists as part of a general program of
counterterrorism would accordingly impose the type of neutral and generally applicable
regulation that does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even though, as the Court
acknowledged in Smith,
leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that
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Purposivists, however, may be able to handle Wayte. They could point out that
because Wayte involved a defense of selective prosecution, it considered a claim
that could be made only by those who had violated a concededly valid law. As we
have seen, purposivists generally acknowledge that laws of general applicability
usually pose only limited threats to disfavored speech or speakers because the laws’
reach is not limited to disfavored speech or speakers.200 Investigations, in contrast,
such as the surveillance at a radical mosque, can be initiated on the basis of the
prosecutor’s hostility to disfavored speech or speakers, and because investigations
can scrutinize the activities of even those whose conduct is lawful, they impose
special burdens on those who have broken no laws—generally applicable or
otherwise.201 It is this chilling effect of investigations predicated on the basis of
constitutionally protected speech that is at the core of the objections to First
Amendment investigations.202
The argument for circumscribing First Amendment investigations based on their
potential chilling effects is a substantial one. First Amendment doctrine exhibits
considerable concern about the manner in which government regulation may
produce self-censorship of protected speech when a regulation creates a risk that
even those engaged in protected expression may be sanctioned.203 For example,
laws that prohibit a substantial volume of protected speech may be challenged as
overbroad even by a litigant whose own conduct was unprotected because of the
chilling effect that such regulations may have on third parties who wish to engage
in protected expression but may be inhibited by the existence of overbroad laws.204
The Court has similarly condemned vague laws on the ground that their uncertain
reach may chill protected expression.205 The Court has also recognized a right to
engage in anonymous speech to avoid the risk of self-censorship that may occur if
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh
the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
494 U.S. at 890. Even Professor Lininger, who is a harsh critic of these investigations,
concedes that they would likely survive attack under the Free Exercise Clause. See Lininger,
supra note 166, at 1240–41.
200. See supra text accompanying note 10. In that vein, the Court in Wayte took pains to
note that even vocal nonregistrant protesters could avoid prosecution by registering in
response to the demand of the government. See 470 U.S. at 609–10.
201. For example, in an action brought by a church attacking what it regarded as an
improper government investigation targeting the church and its membership, the church was
able to demonstrate that attendance and donations declined as a result of the challenged
investigation. See Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 521–22 (9th
Cir. 1989). Nevertheless, Daniel Solove is surely right that in the main, “[D]emanding
empirical evidence of deterrence is impractical because it will often be impossible to
produce.” Solove, supra note 190, at 155.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 189–90.
203. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the
“Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 689–725 (1978).
204. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118–20 (2003); Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244, 255 (2002); Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews
for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574–76 (1987).
205. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872–74 (1997); Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 597–604 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963).
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those who wish to express unpopular views were required to identify themselves.206
For this same reason it has held that organizations engaged in political or social
advocacy cannot be compelled to disclose their membership.207 The Court has
similarly recognized a right of individuals not to be compelled to disclose their
social or political associations or views,208 and it has also held that individuals
cannot be compelled to specifically request delivery of mail considered by the
government to be communist propaganda because of the potential chilling effect of
such a requirement.209 The Court’s First Amendment anti-retaliation doctrine is in
the same vein; the Court has held that the government may not retaliate against an
individual for exercising his First Amendment rights by withholding benefits
because this too may inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights.210
These various First Amendment doctrines, however, all involve the imposition
of some form of penalty on a speaker—the cases involve speakers who face
sanctions if they engage in some form of protected expression or refuse to disclose
information about their protected expression, or, at a minimum, face the loss of a
benefit as the cost of exercising First Amendment rights. Investigations are
different. If the investigation produces evidence that a speaker has violated an
otherwise valid law, then the speaker will be prosecuted for unprotected conduct.
Even if his or her speech triggered the investigation, Wayte makes plain that the
First Amendment offers no defense. If the speaker violated no law, however, the
investigation will result in no sanctions. To be sure, there is a risk that an
investigation will wrongly produce an enforcement action against a speaker whose
activities are protected, but if the substantive law being enforced is neither
impermissibly overbroad, vague, nor otherwise invalid, then the risk of error in
such a prosecution is not itself a basis for constitutional complaint. The risk of error
that inheres in all litigation is not itself sufficient to support a First Amendment
claim.211

206. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York v. Vill. of Stratton, 536
U.S. 150, 166–67 (2002); Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 197–200
(1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–43 (1995); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960).
207. See, e.g., Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigations Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 556–57
(1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523–27 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–63 (1958).
208. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 7 (1971); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 485–90 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250–55 (1957).
209. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 306–07 (1965).
210. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588–89 & n.10 (1998); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597–98 (1972).
211. The Court has made this point, for example, in the context of obscenity statutes:
It may be true that the stiffer RICO penalties will provide an additional
deterrent to those who might otherwise sell obscene materials; perhaps this
means—as petitioner suggests—that some cautious booksellers will practice
self-censorship and remove First Amendment protected materials from their
shelves. But deterrence of the sale of obscene materials is a legitimate end of
state antiobscenity laws, and our cases have long recognized the practical
reality that “any form of criminal obscenity statute applicable to a bookseller
will induce some tendency to self-censorship and have some inhibitory effect
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It is far from clear that an investigation unaccompanied by compulsion exerted
on the target or any other type of sanction or penalty constitutes an “abridgement”
of the freedom of speech, or of the press. During the investigation, the speaker
remains free to communicate with others even as the investigators attempt to learn
more about the speaker’s activities. The existence of the investigation may cause
the target to engage in some form of self-censorship, but not because the
government has exercised any coercive power other than the power to investigate.
When an investigative target remains free to speak, and faces no sanction—not
even the need to shoulder the costs of defending an enforcement action—it is far
from clear that the First Amendment is offended.
Indeed, the distinction between regulations that attach sanctions to protected
speech and mere investigations was central to the only case in which the Court
considered First Amendment investigations. In Laird v. Tatum,212 the plaintiffs
challenged under the First Amendment “the Army’s alleged ‘surveillance of lawful
and peaceful civilian political activity.’”213 While acknowledging that it “ha[d]
found in a number of cases that constitutional violations may arise from the
deterrent, or ‘chilling,’ effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct
prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights,” the Court added, “in
each of these cases, the challenged exercise of governmental power was regulatory,
proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complainant was either presently or
prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he was
challenging.”214 The Court accordingly framed the question before it as
whether the jurisdiction of a federal court may be invoked by a
complainant who alleges that the exercise of his First Amendment
rights is being chilled by the mere existence, without more, of a
governmental investigative and data-gathering activity that is alleged to
be broader in scope than is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of a valid governmental purpose.215
The Court held that the claim was nonjusticiable because it rested on no more than
the plaintiffs’ “perception of the system as inappropriate” or their “speculative
apprehensiveness that the Army may at some future date misuse the information in
some way that would cause direct harm to [plaintiffs].”216
The precise holding of Laird is narrow—the Court considered the alleged
chilling effect of a program of intelligence gathering “without more.”217 The lower
courts have accordingly read Laird to render nonjusticiable First Amendment
attacks on an investigation when the plaintiff cannot prove that it was a target of an
on the dissemination of material not obscene.” The mere assertion of some
possible self-censorship resulting from a statute is not enough to render an
antiobscenity law unconstitutional under our precedents.
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 60 (1989) (citations omitted) (quoting
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154–55 (1959)).
212. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
213. Id. at 2.
214. Id. at 11.
215. Id. at 10.
216. Id. at 13.
217. Id. at 10.
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investigation,218 but plaintiffs who can establish that they have actually been
targeted for investigation are usually thought to have presented justiciable claims,
at least when they also establish objective evidence of a chilling effect associated
with the complained-of investigation or some other tangible consequence for the
protected activities of the investigative target.219 Nevertheless, Laird’s distinction
between coercive regulation, proscription, or compulsion and mere investigation
seems to hold no less significance for substantive First Amendment doctrine than
justiciability.
Consider the First Amendment right to anonymous speech. It is settled that the
First Amendment affords a right to distribute leaflets and other literature
anonymously.220 It is equally settled that leafleting cannot be prohibited as a means
of preventing littering.221 But neither of these doctrines goes so far as to prevent a
police officer who observes anonymously distributed leaflets scattered on the
sidewalk from interviewing witnesses who may have seen the littering take place in
order to learn the identity of the littering leafleter who prefers anonymity.222 As we
have seen, the First Amendment does not permit the government to compel an
individual to surrender anonymity; but if the government is able to determine the
individual’s identity by obtaining the cooperation of the investigation’s target or

218. See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 688–92 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gibbons, J.,
concurring); United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378–81 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Amnesty Int’l U.S.A. v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 642–57 (S.D.N.Y. 2009);
see also Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326, 330–33 (2d Cir. 1973) (suit
attacking FBI’s investigation into the size of the demonstration organized by the plaintiff
was nonjusticiable).
219. See, e.g., Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 1997); Smith v. Brady,
972 F.2d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992); Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582, 584–85
(10th Cir. 1990); Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 820 F.2d 518, 521–23 (9th
Cir. 1989); Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 92–94 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Gandhi v.
Police Dep’t of Detroit, 747 F.2d 338, 349–50 (6th Cir. 1984); Ozonoff v. Berzak, 744 F.2d
224, 227–30 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Paton v. La Prado, 524 F.2d 862, 867–68 (3d Cir. 1975);
Phila. Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc’y of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335, 1338–39 (3d
Cir. 1975); Jabara v. Kelly, 476 F. Supp. 561, 568 (E.D. Mich. 1979), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982); Founding Church of
Scientology v. FBI, 459 F. Supp. 748, 760 (D.D.C. 1978); Berlin Democratic Club v.
Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 148–49 (D.D.C. 1976); Alliance to End Repression v.
Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 115, 116–17 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Lowenstein v. Rooney, 401 F. Supp.
952, 958 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Phila. Resistance v. Mitchell, 58 F.R.D. 139, 143 (E.D. Pa.
1972); Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766, 769–71 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); cf.
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 472–77 (1987) (supporting justiciability where requirement
that distributor of foreign film comply with registration and disclosure requirements for
“political propaganda” created sufficiently objective basis for a claim of chilling effect). For
a more elaborate discussion of this point, see Scott Michelman, Who Can Sue over
Government Surveillance?, 57 UCLA L. REV. 71 (2009).
220. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–43 (1995); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960).
221. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162–63 (1939).
222. Cf. Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding
that the First Amendment grants no right to resist subpoena seeking to discover infringer’s
identity where anonymous speaker engaged in unprotected copyright infringement).
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others, there is no First Amendment doctrine that declares such an investigation
illegitimate. Albeit in the context of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court has been quite clear on this point:
“[W]hen an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk
that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities.”223 Thus, if
witnesses, or the leafleter himself, discloses to the investigator the identity of the
littering leafleter, it is hard to understand how the First Amendment is offended.
Under Wayte, an ensuing prosecution for littering would seem to be constitutionally
unremarkable.
To be sure, the government’s ability to compromise anonymity through an
investigation may well have a chilling effect on speech, but the doctrine addressing
claims of a “chill” associated with an investigation undertaken for an ostensibly
proper law-enforcement purpose takes an intensely pragmatic approach quite
inconsistent with the purposivists’ focus on the risk of an illicit governmental
motive. Even in contexts rife with a risk of improper motive, when the government
is merely gathering information rather than imposing sanctions, the Court has
carefully balanced the magnitude of the burden on speech against the governmental
interests at stake, without evident concern about the risk of improper governmental
motive, much less the use of strict scrutiny.
For example, in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities
Control Board,224 the Court considered an administrative order requiring the
Communist Party to register as a subversive organization and disclose its
membership and officers.225 The Court rejected an argument that the First
Amendment shielded the party unless the board found that it specifically intended
to overthrow the government, noting that the Subversive Activities Control Act “is
a regulatory, not a prohibitory statute.”226 Despite the cases recognizing a First
Amendment right to engage in anonymous speech, the Court upheld the disclosure
requirement in light of “the magnitude of the public interests which the registration
and disclosure provisions are designed to protect and in the pertinence which
registration and disclosure bear to the protection of those interests.”227 Thus,
despite the risk of a governmental motive to harm a particularly disfavored speaker,
the Court engaged in classic balancing—stressing that the law imposed no
prohibition on protected expression and that it advanced particularly important
governmental interests.
Similarly, in Barenblatt v. United States,228 the Court rejected a witness’s
assertion of a First Amendment right to resist disclosing information about his
membership in the Communist Party in a legislative investigation, explaining that
cases involving prohibitions on protected associational activity were inapposite

223. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984). For additional discussion of
this point, see supra note 187.
224. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
225. Id. at 4–22.
226. Id. at 56.
227. Id. at 93.
228. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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because the case involved an investigation and not a prosecution.229 The Court
upheld the investigative demand by applying a balancing test.230
One might think the cases upholding investigations of persons or organizations
thought to be subversive mere relics of the darkest days of the Cold War, but the
same approach was taken decades later in Meese v. Keene.231 The Court upheld a
provision in the Foreign Agents Registration Act that required those who distribute
foreign films identified by the State Department as “political propaganda” to
register and disclose their business activities, their political activities, and the extent
of the film’s distribution.232 The decision was based on three considerations: first,
the requirements “d[id] nothing to place regulated expressive materials ‘beyond the
pale of legitimate discourse,’” but instead “simply required the disseminators of
such material to make additional disclosures that would better enable the public to
evaluate the import of the propaganda”;233 second, “the term ‘political propaganda’
. . . is a broad, neutral one rather than a pejorative one”;234 and third, Congress’s
use of that term “does not lead us to suspend the respect we normally owe to the
Legislature’s power to define the terms that it uses in legislation.”235 The Court
reached this conclusion even though the term “political propaganda” was defined as
advocacy of the views of a foreign country or political faction, or advocacy that
promotes some form of instability or violence.236 Thus, the Court considered what
it regarded as a modest chilling effect imposed by the registration and disclosure
requirements to be adequately justified—another instance of pragmatic balancing.
Accordingly, in a context rife with a risk of discrimination against disfavored
speakers or views—the kind of case in which the purposivists argue that strict
scrutiny is required—the Court utilized nothing like the strict scrutiny test, and
concluded that the limited burden imposed by the legislation was adequately
justified.237

229. See id. at 130.
230. Id. at 126–34.
231. 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
232. Id. at 469–70.
233. Id. at 480.
234. Id. at 483 (footnote omitted).
235. Id. at 484.
236. Id. at 471–72 (“‘The term “political propaganda” includes any oral, visual, graphic,
written, pictorial, or other communication or expression by any person (1) which is
reasonably adapted to, or which the person disseminating the same believes will, or which he
intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way influence a
recipient or any section of the public within the United States with reference to the political
or public interests, policies, or relations of a government or a foreign country or a foreign
political party or with reference to the foreign policies of the United States or promote in the
United States racial, religious, or social dissensions, or (2) which advocates, advises,
instigates, or promotes any racial, social, political, or religious disorder, civil riot, or other
conflict involving the use of force or violence in any other American republic or the
overthrow of any government or political subdivision of any other American republic by any
means involving the use of force or violence.’” (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 611(j) (1982))).
237. Keene is not the only example in which the Court has engaged in deferential review
of compelled disclosure of confidential information after concluding that the inhibitory
effect of the compelled disclosure was not likely to be great. See, e.g., Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC,
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Yet, the balance in these cases does not always favor the government. In cases
involving legislative investigations in which there was less reason to believe that
the disclosures demanded were likely to produce evidence of subversive or other
unlawful activities, for example, the Court struck the balance in favor of a First
Amendment right to resist disclosure.238 In none of these cases did the subject of
the investigation face any type of penalty or sanction (beyond the sanctions
available if they failed to cooperate with the investigation); the chilling effect of the
investigation itself was regarded as sufficient to invoke the protections of the First
Amendment.
In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,239 similarly, the Court invalidated a statute
empowering a state obscenity commission to notify distributors of material that it
had found objectionable and potentially subject to prosecution under state
obscenity laws on the ground that the statute created an unacceptable risk that
distributors would engage in self-censorship with respect to material that had not
been adjudicated to be obscene.240 Bantam Books involved a far greater inhibitory
threat than Meese v. Keene—the targeted films were put at a serious competitive
disadvantage by the threat of criminal prosecution with little evident justification,
since the state was free to bring obscenity prosecutions against the film distributors
if it were serious about the films’ illegality.
Thus, in cases in which the government imposes no prohibition or direct cost on
the exercise of First Amendment rights, the Court will consider claims of “chilling
effect,” but only by balancing the degree of the inhibition against the governmental
interests at stake—not by considering the risk of impermissible motivation, as the
purposivists would have it. The difference between Bantam Books and Meese v.
Keene or the Cold War cases does not seem to be based on the increased risk of a
governmental motive to burden disfavored speakers, but instead on the potency of
the inhibitory effect of the challenged law, coupled with the lack of a sufficient
justification to warrant such a potentially powerful tool for chilling the exercise of
First Amendment rights.
The Court’s campaign finance disclosure cases reflect the same pattern. Despite
the First Amendment interests in anonymity, the Court has upheld disclosure
requirements for contributors to political campaigns in light of the government’s
interests in promoting political accountability by candidates, deterring corruption,
and assisting law enforcement.241 Yet, the Court has invalidated disclosure

493 U.S. 182, 195–202 (1990) (enforcing subpoena, in litigation alleging unlawful sex
discrimination in tenure denial, that required the production of confidential peer review
materials despite First Amendment protections for academic freedom); Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153, 172–75 (1979) (rejecting a constitutional privilege against inquiry into the
editorial process in defamation litigation despite First Amendment protections for the press).
238. See DeGregory v. Attorney Gen. of N.H., 383 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1966) (legislative
investigation into suspected subversive activities); Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation
Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 550–58 (1963) (legislative investigation of civil rights organization);
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523–25 (1960) (same); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–66 (1958) (same).
239. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
240. Id. at 66–72.
241. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913–17 (2010); McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93, 194–99 (2003), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
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requirements as applied to a minor party on the ground that the governmental
interests at stake were less compelling and the risk of harassment or intimidation of
minor-party contributors much greater.242
Thus, the aforementioned cases involving the potential “chilling effect” of
government actions that fall short of prohibiting or penalizing protected speech
concern themselves with balancing the extent of the inhibition and its justification,
not the government’s motivation. Purposivism has no evident place here, and with
good reason. A jurisprudence that concerns itself primarily with the government’s
motive, thereby equating a mere investigation of a politically unpopular group with
an outright prohibition on its existence, seems an awfully poor approach for
identifying “abridgements” of the freedom of speech. After all, a discrete and
limited investigation, even if undertaken for entirely improper reasons, poses little
risk of suppressing anything; indeed, its targets may be entirely unaware that the
investigation has taken place. A focus on motive seems quite out of place in this
context.
But perhaps the purposivists can handle even this objection. After all, the
purposivists argue that the threat of improper motivation justifies only heightened
scrutiny, not automatic acceptance of a First Amendment claim. Purposivists could
argue that the balancing in this line of cases reflects precisely the kind of strict
scrutiny that they advocate—even if the cases themselves do not use the lingo of
strict scrutiny. Yet, it is unclear that this is a fair characterization of the cases. As
we have seen, in cases arising in contexts with the kind of high risk of improper
motivation in which the purposivists claim that strict scrutiny is required, the Court
upheld regulations without much evidence of heightened scrutiny. In the
Subversive Activities Control Act case, for example, the Court expressly deferred
to congressional judgment,243 as it did again in Meese v. Keene.244 Thus, less severe
restrictions on communicative liberty seem to draw less intensive scrutiny,
regardless of the risk of improper governmental motive.
In any event, even if the balancing in chilling effect cases can be reconciled with
the purposivist account, there are other objections to be considered—in particular, a
pragmatic claim that strict scrutiny of First Amendment investigations is inherently
unworkable and that such a standard compromises critical law-enforcement
interests.

876; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60–74 (1976) (per curiam); cf. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct.
2811, 2818–21 (2010) (upholding on its face a statutory requirement of disclosure of the
identities of those signing petitions seeking a referendum to overturn a state statute).
242. See Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91–101 (1982).
The Court has also left open the possibility that the disclosure of the identities of those who
have signed petitions seeking a referendum to overturn a state statute could run afoul of the
First Amendment on a sufficient showing that disclosure would subject signatories to a
serious threat of retaliation. See Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2821.
243. See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 94–97 (1961).
244. 481 U.S. 465, 484 (1987).
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C. The Pragmatic Case for Balancing
The difficulties in applying heightened scrutiny to investigative activities are
reflected in the proposals of those who advocate First Amendment restrictions on
such investigations. These commentators argue that some evidentiary threshold and
procedural protections—such as probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a
crime is underway and the use of the least restrictive means to investigate—should
be required for investigations based on or directed at collecting information about
expressive activities protected by the First Amendment.245 In fact, powerful
pragmatic considerations underlie the balancing test that we have seen provides a
doctrinal basis for undertaking a constitutional assessment of First Amendment
investigations, while simultaneously counseling against the commentators’
proposals for more exacting forms of judicial review.
The probable-cause and reasonable-suspicion standards fit the investigative
context poorly, if at all. Reasonable suspicion is the standard required by the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure when an investigator
“seizes” an individual by depriving him of the freedom of movement.246 Probable
cause is the standard required to take an individual into custody for anything more
than a brief period of investigative detention.247 When there is no search or seizure,
however, the Fourth Amendment does not limit investigative activities even when
an investigation has focused on a particular suspect.248 It is therefore far from clear
that these probable-cause or reasonable-suspicion standards—crafted to be sensitive
to the balance between liberty and order when the government effectively takes an
individual into physical custody—have any place when investigators impose no
direct restraint on liberty.
The practical objection to a probable-cause or reasonable-suspicion requirement
for an investigation involving no “search” or “seizure” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment should be plain: if the government is prohibited from initiating
an investigation of an extremist group on the basis of its speech, its ability to

245. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 190, at 661–73 (requiring reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity and use of the least restrictive means to investigate on the basis of protected
activities); Lininger, supra note 166, at 1269–71 (requiring particularized suspicion of
criminal activity); Lynch, supra note 190, at 299–300 (requiring probable cause to believe
target has violated or is violating the law and the use of least restrictive means for
investigation of protected activities in nonpublic settings); Solove, supra note 190, at 154–63
(requiring investigations that gather a substantial amount of information about protected
activities to be narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial government interest, ordinarily
requiring a warrant and probable cause); Strandburg, supra note 190, at 804–11 (requiring
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to investigate groups on the basis of protected
activities and probable cause to investigate individuals); Eric Lardiere, Comment, The
Justiciability and Constitutionality of Political Intelligence Gathering, 30 UCLA L. REV.
976, 1018–34 (1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion and least restrictive means).
246. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185–89 (2004);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498–99 (1983); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 880–82 (1975).
247. See, e.g., Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629–30 (2003) (per curiam); Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209–16 (1979).
248. See supra note 187.
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develop the requisite probable cause or reasonable suspicion necessary to support
more intrusive investigative techniques—such as search or seizure—will be greatly
circumscribed. A mosque known for its advocacy of extreme forms of Islam may
be a breeding ground for terrorists, but if investigators cannot conduct interviews or
commence a surveillance to determine if known terrorists are gathering there, there
is little chance that probable cause or reasonable suspicion will ever emerge—until
it is too late.
After all, incipient terrorist organizations rarely advertise their intentions. If the
authorities are forbidden to commence an investigation until they somehow
stumble onto evidence amounting to probable cause or reasonable suspicion—the
type of evidence that might pass muster under some form of heightened scrutiny—
then investigations that uncover extremists groups as they cross the line from
advocacy into criminality will be few and far between.249 Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence recognizes this point by limiting the probable-cause and reasonablesuspicion requirements to investigations sufficiently intrusive to be considered
“searches” or “seizures.” It is quite unclear that First Amendment jurisprudence
should take a different approach.
A least-restrictive-means requirement is equally problematic. In Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, a least-restrictive-means requirement for investigations
has been emphatically rejected on eminently pragmatic grounds: “[T]he logic of
such elaborate less-restrictive alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers
to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers.”250 Again, it is unclear
that this observation has any less potency in the First Amendment context.
These very considerations were at the root of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Branzburg v. Hayes.251 In that case, reporters argued that—because of the

249. Judge Posner wrote, in ruling to modify a decree that required the Chicago Police
Department to refrain from investigations of activities protected by the First Amendment
absent reasonable suspicion:
New groups of political extremists, believers in and advocates of violence, form
daily around the world. If one forms in or migrates to Chicago, the decree
renders the police helpless to do anything to protect the public against the day
when the group decides to commit a terrorist act. Until the group goes beyond
the advocacy of violence and begins preparatory actions that might create
reasonable suspicion of imminent criminal activity, the hands of the police are
tied. And if the police have been forbidden to investigate until then, if the
investigation cannot begin until the group is well on its way toward the
commission of terrorist acts, the investigation may come too late to prevent the
acts or to identify the perpetrators. If police get wind that a group of people
have begun meeting and discussing the desirability of committing acts of
violence in pursuit of an ideological agenda, a due regard for the public safety
counsels allowing the police department to monitor the statements of the
group’s members, to build a file, perhaps to plant an undercover agent.
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2001).
250. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002) (quoting
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 n.12 (1976)); accord, e.g., Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 350–51 (2001); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647
(1983).
251. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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inhibitory effect that compelled disclosure would have on newsgathering—the First
Amendment does not permit a grand jury to use its subpoena power to compel them
to disclose confidential sources unless:
sufficient grounds are shown for believing that the reporter possesses
information relevant to a crime the grand jury is investigating, that the
information the reporter has is unavailable from other sources, and that
need for the information is sufficiently compelling to override the
claimed invasion of First Amendment interests occasioned by its
disclosure.252
Rejecting this claim, the Court stressed that the obligation to testify before a grand
jury involved no prohibition or penalty on what the press may publish;253 that the
extent to which this obligation would inhibit journalists was highly speculative;254
and that historically “the press has operated without constitutional protection for
press informants, and the press has flourished.”255 The Court concluded that even
assuming that
an undetermined number of informants . . . will . . . refuse to talk to
newsmen if they fear identification by a reporter in an official
investigation, we cannot accept the argument that the public interest in
possible future news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources
must take precedence over the public interest in pursuing and
prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus
deterring the commission of such crimes in the future.256
Surveying the governmental interests supporting an expansive investigative
power, the Court observed that because the grand jury’s “task is to inquire into the
existence of possible criminal conduct . . . its investigative powers are necessarily
broad.”257 Requiring a preliminary showing of necessity to hale a journalist before

252. Id. at 680.
253. As the Court explained:
We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the
country’s welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for
First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press could be eviscerated. But these cases involve no intrusions
upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the press may
publish, and no express or implied command that the press publish what it
prefers to withhold. No exaction or tax for the privilege of publishing, and no
penalty, civil or criminal, related to the content of published material is at issue
here. The use of confidential sources by the press is not forbidden or restricted;
reporters remain free to seek news from any source by means within the law.
No attempt is made to require the press to publish its sources of information or
indiscriminately to disclose them on request.
Id. at 681–82.
254. See id. at 693–95.
255. Id. at 698–99.
256. Id. at 695.
257. Id. at 688. Thus, “[t]he investigative power of the grand jury is necessarily broad if
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a grand jury, the Court concluded, was inconsistent with the grand jury’s interest in
examining all relevant evidence.258 Moreover, “a constitutional newsman’s
privilege would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order.”259
The Court would be pressed to afford such a privilege to anyone claiming to be
gathering information in order to engage in protected expression,260 and a
requirement that a subpoena advanced a compelling governmental interest would
enmesh the courts in difficult decisions of law-enforcement policy beyond their
expertise.261 The Court added that “there is much force in the pragmatic view that
the press has at its disposal powerful mechanisms of communication and is far from
helpless to protect itself from harassment or substantial harm.”262 In any event,
news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections, and
grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in good
faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolution under the First
Amendment. Official harassment of the press undertaken not for
purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter’s relationship
with his news sources would have no justification.263
Thus, in a context in which the inhibitory effect of an investigation on protected
expression was surely no less than the chilling effect of an investigation based on
or directed at protected activities, the Court engaged in pragmatic balancing, while
resisting strict scrutiny because of the many difficulties in determining what type of
investigative activities can survive such scrutiny. Although Branzburg
acknowledges a limit to the investigative power, this limit requires only a goodfaith law investigative justification for a subpoena, or, under the standard proposed
by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion, some legitimate law-enforcement
justification for the subpoena.264 This is a standard remarkably like that employed
its public responsibility is to be adequately discharged.” Id. at 700 (citing Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956)).
258. As the Court explained:
The role of the grand jury as an important instrument of effective law
enforcement necessarily includes an investigatory function with respect to
determining whether a crime has been committed and who committed it. To
this end it must call witnesses, in the manner best suited to perform its task.
“When the grand jury is performing its investigatory function into a general
problem area . . . society’s interest is best served by a thorough and extensive
investigation.” A grand jury investigation “is not fully carried out until every
available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every proper
way to find if a crime has been committed.” Such an investigation may be
triggered by tips, rumors, evidence proffered by the prosecutor, or the personal
knowledge of the grand jurors. It is only after the grand jury has examined the
evidence that a determination of whether the proceeding will result in an
indictment can be made.
Id. at 701–02 (citations omitted).
259. Id. at 703–04.
260. Id. at 704–05.
261. Id. at 705–06.
262. Id. at 706.
263. Id. at 707–08 (footnote omitted).
264. Although Justice Powell joined the opinion of the Court which, as we have seen,
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by the courts that have rejected any form of heightened scrutiny for First

required only a good-faith investigative purpose while rejecting any form of heightened
scrutiny or evidentiary showing to support a subpoena to a reporter, his separate opinion
articulates the standard for resisting a subpoena somewhat differently:
If a newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being conducted
in good faith he is not without remedy. Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to
give information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject
of the investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe that his testimony
implicates confidential source relationships without a legitimate need of law
enforcement, he will have access to the court on a motion to quash and an
appropriate protective order may be entered.
Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). The only advocate of First Amendment limitations on the
investigative power to consider Branzburg is Professor Solove, who stresses Justice Powell’s
separate opinion, which provided the fifth vote for the majority’s disposition of the case, as
supporting the view that the First Amendment limits investigative authority. See Solove,
supra note 190, at 150–51. Yet, Justice Powell did not require probable cause or any form of
heightened scrutiny, and he placed the burden on the reporter to establish that a subpoena
was unsupported by any legitimate law-enforcement purpose. This standard differs little if at
all from the standard governing the enforceability of all grand jury subpoenas, which was
developed in an opinion that cited Branzburg in support of the standard it adopted. See
United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299–302 (1991). The courts of appeals
have consistently read Branzburg to reject any type of First Amendment defense to a grand
jury subpoena supported by some legitimate law-enforcement purpose. See, e.g., N.Y. Times
Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 172–74 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith
Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1145–49 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37,
44–46 (1st Cir. 2004); Scarce v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 5 F.3d 397,
399–402 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Long (In re Shain), 978 F.2d 850, 852–53 (4th Cir.
1992); Storer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 583–
86 (6th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court has consistently cited Branzburg for the proposition
that the press is obligated to comply with generally applicable legal obligations despite the
burden that compliance places on newsgathering. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501
U.S. 663, 669–71 (1991); Univ. of Pa. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 493
U.S. 182, 201 (1990); Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 704 (1986); Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581 (1983); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833–35 (1974). To be sure, some lower courts have recognized a
qualified reporter’s privilege, albeit without specifically holding that the privilege is
constitutionally compelled rather than simply a balancing process typically undertaken when
assessing claims of common law privilege. See, e.g., LaRouche v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d
1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 76–77 (2d Cir. 1983);
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 710–15 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630
F.2d 139, 147–48 (3d Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725–27
(5th Cir. 1980). The question of whether the public interest in facilitating vigorous reporting
justifies a common law privilege is not of constitutional dimension and accordingly presents
different considerations from the First Amendment issue addressed in Branzburg. See, e.g.,
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d at 1166–72 (Tatel, J., concurring);
McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531–32 (7th Cir. 2003). In any event, only four circuits
have recognized even a qualified reporter’s privilege in criminal cases, and that privilege
rarely results in protection for reporters. See James Thomas Tucker & Stephen Wermiel,
Enacting a Reasonable Federal Shield Law: A Reply to Professors Clymer and Eliason, 57
AM. U. L. REV. 1291, 1308–10 (2008); see also 3 SMOLLA, supra note 2, §§ 3.26, 3.26.50
(surveying decisions in the lower courts).
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Amendment investigations.265 More important for present purposes, this approach
is wholly inconsistent with the purposivist account.
As we have seen, purposivists believe that strict scrutiny is warranted when
enforcement officials exercise largely unchecked discretion because of the risk that
they act on the basis of impermissible motives, coupled with the difficulties in
requiring litigants to adduce proof of illicit motive.266 These risks are fully present
when prosecutors and grand juries exercise their discretion to subpoena reporters to
testify before a grand jury. In Branzburg, for example, two of the consolidated
cases involved stories suggesting that the incumbent prosecutor had failed to
effectively control drug dealing in the area,267 and two others involved reporters
who had covered African American militants.268 Prosecutors might readily be
expected to subpoena reporters who are exposing government inefficiency or
offering potentially sympathetic coverage to dissidents than for reporters engaged
in more mainstream fare.
More generally, there surely is a natural temptation to believe that one’s political
opponents—especially those of the most extreme hues—are up to no good, and a
concurrent temptation to use investigative resources in an effort to develop
substance to one’s suspicions. Those who would indulge these temptations are
equally likely to be less than fully sensitive to the impact of such investigations on
the ability of dissident groups to attract and retain support in the face of such
scrutiny. From the point of view of the authorities in power, that kind of chilling
effect may count as what an economist might call a second-order benefit of the
investigation, not one of its costs. It is considerations of this character that are at the
heart of the purposivist case for strict scrutiny; as we have seen, purposivists regard
strict scrutiny as justified in order to relieve litigants of what is thought to be the
unrealistic burden of adducing proof of actual motive.269 Yet, under Branzburg, the
risk of improper motive when the government elects to require reporters to disclose
their sources produces nothing like strict scrutiny.
Indeed, one might argue that there is no justification for any First Amendment
limitations on investigation. Given that investigative agencies operate in a world of
limited resources, one might believe that there is little reason to believe that the
authorities will undertake investigations without adequate justification. Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, however, rejects such a presumption of governmental
efficiency and instead requires at least reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to
undertake a seizure, as we have seen.270 The rather extensive history of abusive
investigations targeting political dissidents also cuts against the view that the
government is unlikely to overreach in the exercise of its investigative powers.271
And, as we have seen, there is ample reason to believe that investigative tactics will
be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the hostility of elected officials to
reporting inconsistent with their own political interests.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See supra text accompanying note 188.
See supra text accompanying notes 6–9.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667–70.
Id. at 672–78.
See supra text accompanying notes 7–9.
See supra text accompanying note 246.
See supra text accompanying notes 172–86.
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Yet, the pragmatic arguments against intrusive judicial oversight are
overwhelming—if the government can undertake only those investigations it can
demonstrate are likely to bear fruit, few if any investigations will begin until after a
crime has already claimed its victims. It is surely rational for the government to
undertake an investigation of speech that appears to condone violence, or of groups
who have a track record of violence, not only to discover incipient plots, but to
learn something of the structure and membership of potentially violent groups. That
knowledge provides a useful source of investigative leads should a crime
subsequently occur that could reasonably be attributed to a member of the group.
For example, some knowledge of the structure and membership of extreme antiabortion groups would provide a useful source of investigative leads should a
prominent abortionist subsequently be murdered; and law-enforcement officials
might rationally decide to obtain those leads before anyone is murdered, rather than
delay their investigation by developing these leads only after someone has died.
Moreover, as we have seen, the argument for intelligence gathering is particularly
powerful for politically motivated crimes less likely to be deterred by after-the-fact
punishment, such as 9/11-style terrorism.272 But although these forms of
intelligence gathering might be rational, on the purposivist account, something
more than mere rationality should be required when the government is able to
impose special disabilities on disfavored speech or speakers. Nevertheless, the
pragmatic objections to that view have carried the day in First Amendment
jurisprudence. From Wayte to Branzburg, the Court has consistently held that any
plausible law-enforcement justification for an investigation triggered by protected
speech will be sufficient to stave off a challenge, despite the risk that dissenters will
experience potent chilling effects on their First Amendment rights.
D. The Pragmatic Approach to First Amendment Investigations
Thus, First Amendment doctrine provides little support for the view that an
investigation directed at or initiated by protected expression must satisfy some form
of heightened scrutiny. Neither does it suggest that the First Amendment is silent
about such investigations. The degree of intrusion on First Amendment interests as
well as the justification for the investigation must be considered.
A discrete investigation of which the target may be entirely unaware has little
potential to chill protected speech beyond the type of general chilling effect created
by the mere knowledge that the government engaged in such investigations—a chill
considered nonjusticiable in Laird. Even if the subject learns of the investigation, it
is far from clear that this knowledge will be sufficient to deter the subject from
engaging in protected activities.273 Indeed, in Branzburg, the Court was

272. See supra text accompanying notes 158–68.
273. For example, a survey of Muslim Americans after the attacks of September 11
concluded that although more than 70% of those surveyed believed that the government
monitored their use of the Internet, 86.8% of respondents indicated that they had not changed
their Internet behavior after September 11. See Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Chilling Effect of
Government Surveillance Programs on the Use of the Internet by Muslim-Americans, 7 U.
MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 375, 390–91 (2007).

58

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:1

understandably reluctant to engage in this type of speculation.274 Moreover, if the
investigation has a plausible law-enforcement justification, a court will not attempt
to assess its investigative merits because it is so difficult to know what an
investigation will bring to light unless it is conducted. It is equally impracticable
for courts to tolerate the delay that would inhere in permitting the parties to litigate
every investigative proposal before it is executed, even putting aside the problems
with alerting the target to the investigation in order to permit litigation of its
propriety. Indulging what could be endless judicial second-guessing after the fact
about whether some less restrictive investigative option could have been pursued
seems no more attractive. Even a more modest probable-cause or reasonable
suspicion requirement could be enormously problematic—it is unclear how the
authorities will ever acquire probable cause or reasonable suspicion if
investigations cannot be initiated on a lesser standard. Yet, absolute deference to
investigative decision making is little more attractive; the kind of vindictive poison
pen letters that cost people jobs and marriages as a consequence of the FBI’s most
egregious excesses should make for a strong case under the First Amendment.
These tactics differ little from the kind of penalty for the assertion of First
Amendment rights that the Supreme Court has condemned.
The First Amendment investigation provides a particularly good test for the
purposivist account of the First Amendment because it disaggregates the threat of
an improper governmental motive from the justification and repressive effects of
challenged governmental activity. Investigations undertaken as a consequence of
protected activity or directed at learning about protected activity involve all the
risks of impermissible motive that the purposivists claim justify heightened
scrutiny. Investigators have largely unfettered discretion in deciding whether and
how to undertake an investigation and will likely be quicker to target political
opponents than supporters for investigation. Yet, the only hint of heightened
scrutiny in the case law occurs when there is an especially severe inhibitory effect
lacking an evident justification, as in the minor-party campaign contribution
disclosure or the state obscenity commission cases.275 The risk of impermissible
motive, without more, produces no trace of heightened scrutiny, and the “chilling
effect” cases, as we have seen, utilize straightforward balancing of the individual
and governmental interests at stake. Even when there is some significant risk of
chilling effect—as the Court acknowledged in Branzburg—the justification for
wide investigative powers will trump the uncertain chilling effect of an
investigation that involves no actual prohibition or penalty on protected expression.
The “chilling effect” cases in general, and the First Amendment investigation cases
in particular, demonstrate that the risk of impermissible motivation does not
displace pragmatic balancing in First Amendment adjudication.276

274. See supra text accompanying notes 251–53.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 237–38, 240.
276. One might argue that given the importance of expansive investigative powers,
Branzburg should be understood as a strict scrutiny case in which the government had a
compelling interest in pursuing investigations largely free of judicial scrutiny. For example,
Charles Fried has argued that in assessing the government’s interest in pursuing an
investigation, it is proper to assess the totality of the governmental interest in pursuing wideranging investigations rather than confining the inquiry to the particular investigation at
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Indeed, the First Amendment investigation provides a potent challenge not only
to the purposivists, but also to any absolutist or categorical account of the First
Amendment’s protections. Although there are many different versions of First
Amendment absolutism or categoricalism, the common feature of these accounts is
that they reject balancing and insist that the First Amendment provides absolute
protection for activities that are communicative in character.277 Yet, when it comes
to First Amendment investigations, balancing is inevitable; absolutists have no very
good way to handle First Amendment investigations. An absolutist could prohibit
all First Amendment investigations on the theory that communication that involves
no effort at coercion or other types of interference with the rights of others is
entitled to absolute protection, but a prohibition on investigation triggered by
protected speech would disable the government from learning whether those
engaged in protected speech that nevertheless suggests some potential for
noncommunicative and hence unprotected evils—such as speech endorsing
violence—are in fact working to bring just those evils about. Since it is quite settled
that the First Amendment does not grant a right to use words as a means to
organize for violence or otherwise to undertake unlawful conduct,278 it is hard to
understand why absolutism could demand that the government refrain from
investigating to determine if an unprotected conspiracy is underway.
Justice Douglas’s approach in Branzburg reflects the difficulties with First
Amendment absolutism. In that case, he took the absolutist position that a reporter
can never be compelled to appear before a grand jury except as a target of an
investigation.279 This would mean that a reporter could not be compelled to repeat
as a witness before a grand jury the same matters contained in an already published
account for which the reporter provided no assurances of confidentiality. Surely it
is difficult to see how in such circumstances the reporter’s testimony inhibits
issue. See Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme
Court’s Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755, 765–70 (1963). Accordingly, one could
argue that affording the grand jury wide-ranging investigative power is also the least
restrictive alternative for achieving this compelling interest. Nevertheless, this approach is
inconsistent with Branzburg itself, which rejects strict scrutiny. Moreover, it amounts to a
claim that the government has a compelling interest in freeing itself from intrusive review
under strict scrutiny, which surely puts the cart before the horse. Yet, even this
understanding of Branzburg ultimately acknowledges the centrality of pragmatic balancing
and rejects the purposivist claim that the risk of improper motivation requires heightened
judicial review.
277. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 138–91
(1989); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 16–20 (1970);
LANGE & POWELL, supra note 80, at 269–83, 296–301; David L. Faigman, Reconciling
Individual Rights and Governmental Interests: Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme
Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1555–62 (1992); Fee, supra note 17, at 1157–69;
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255–
63; Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 106–33 (1989). For what is perhaps
the classic statement of First Amendment absolutism, see Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights,
35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874–76 (1960).
278. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010); United States v.
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297–98 (2008).
279. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 712–14 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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freedom of the press to any greater extent that any other generally applicable
burden imposed on reporters or the press, such as the obligation to pay generally
applicable taxes, to which the First Amendment interposes no objection.280 Any
other approach to a reporter’s obligation to testify, however, requires a pragmatic
balance between the chilling effect on newsgathering of the obligation to testify and
the needs of law enforcement, even one that recognizes a qualified reporter’s
privilege to maintain the confidentiality of sources.281
Conversely, an absolutist could permit First Amendment investigations by
denying that investigations have any sufficiently inhibitory effect to implicate the
First Amendment. This approach, however, would permit the most odious abuses in
this area, such as the poison pen letters directed to the employers or spouses of
dissidents, which are likely as potent a means as any of suppressing dissent.282 An
absolutism that permits all First Amendment investigations is little more attractive
than an absolutism that forbids them all.
A due respect for the constitutional protection for expression seems to require
some effort to gauge the inhibitory effects of an investigation, but without wearing
blinders to the need for responsible investigative techniques. Even for the
absolutist, the First Amendment investigation seems inevitably to lead to pragmatic
balancing.
III. THE FREE TRADE IN IDEAS AS THE BALANCING METRIC IN
FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
One should not be too quick to reject the purposivist account in its entirety.
After all, with its many carefully calibrated standards of scrutiny, First Amendment
doctrine is far more complex than a process of ad hoc weighing of costs and
benefits.283 What is more, the purposivists’ attack on balancing has considerable
force. As we have seen, purposivists deny that there is any principled basis for
courts to “balance” free expression against countervailing government interests.284
In this, they are part of a long tradition of First Amendment scholarship that decries
balancing as an invitation to undisciplined judicial subjectivity.285 As one of the

280. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444–50 (1991); Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581 (1983).
281. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 739–43 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
282. See supra text accompanying note 175.
283. See supra text accompanying note 2.
284. See supra text accompanying note 11.
285. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 277, at 125–37; EMERSON, supra note 277, at 16, 167–
68, 717–18; LANGE & POWELL, supra note 80, at 266–69; Laurent B. Frantz, The First
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1432–50 (1962); Steven J. Heyman, Righting
the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U.
L. REV. 1275, 1305–12 (1998); Alexander Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation
Against Political Freedom, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 4, 7–14 (1961); R. George Wright,
Pragmatism and Freedom of Speech, 80 N.D. L. REV. 103, 133–38 (2004). For perhaps the
canonical attack on balancing in constitutional law, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 972–1004 (1987).
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leading scholars in this tradition has argued: “To resolve First Amendment
questions, one cannot avoid making ideological judgments.”286
In the face of these attacks, balancing looks less than satisfying—descriptively
and normatively—as an account of First Amendment doctrine. Yet, balancing can
offer an account of First Amendment doctrine that not only explains the structure of
First Amendment doctrine, but is sensitive as well to the need for doctrinal rigor.
While entirely ad hoc balancing is likely to prove unacceptably indeterminate, First
Amendment doctrine has developed an approach for evaluating the pertinent
interests that makes balancing structured and rigorous by looking at free speech
much the way that economists look at markets.
Long before the birth of the law and economics movement, Justice Holmes
characterized the First Amendment as protecting the “free trade in ideas.”287 The
metaphor of the First Amendment preserving robust competition in a “marketplace
of ideas” has since become a commonplace in First Amendment jurisprudence.288 A
correlative principle has been embraced as well: the Court tells us that the First
Amendment protects the right to receive information no less than the right to
communicate it.289
Thus, the First Amendment values more than the speaker’s individual interest in
communicating; the interests of listeners and the integrity of competition in the
metaphorical marketplace of ideas are critical as well. If one thinks about free
speech as a competitive market in which systemic interests are as important as the
interests of individual speakers, then it becomes possible to develop a metric for
assessing the impact of a challenged regulation on free speech interests.290 Using

286. Eugene Volokh, Pragmatism vs. Ideology in Free Speech Cases, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
33, 34 (2004).
287. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
288. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 885 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831
(1995); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995); United States v.
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 464–65 (1995); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
418 (1989); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988); Members of the City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y.,
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537–38 (1980).
289. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002); Reno, 521
U.S. at 875; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74–75 (1983); Lamont v.
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 306–07 (1965); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383
(1957).
290. This conception of “free trade” in ideas accordingly can be seen as a means toward
maximizing the ability of the “marketplace of ideas” to produce truth. See, e.g., Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First Amendment to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail . . . .”). In
this vein, some argue that limiting regulatory authority over speech is likely to enhance
social welfare by increasing the supply of socially useful speech. See, e.g., ROBERT D.
COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 310–12 (2000); Albert Breton & Ronald Wintrobe,
Freedom of Speech vs. Efficient Regulation in the Marketplace for Ideas, 17 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 217, 233–37 (1992); Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public
Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 558–62 (1991). Others, however,
contend that there are enormous difficulties in the assumption that a free market in
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this metric, First Amendment jurisprudence balances the interest in an unfettered
marketplace of ideas against the regulatory interests of the government in a
reasonably predictable and structured fashion. Regulatory burdens imposed on all
market participants may reduce the quantity of speech just as a generally applicable
tax will reduce demand and hence output, but they are unlikely to have dramatic
effects on competition within the marketplace of ideas. For that reason, they are
generally upheld. Regulatory burdens with the potential to fall unequally on
competitors, in contrast, can skew the market, and therefore pose a qualitatively
different kind of problem for free trade in ideas.291 Thus, the hospitality of First
Amendment jurisprudence to generally applicable laws—as well as the suspicion
directed at content or viewpoint-specific regulation—can be explained without
need of the purposivist account.
A. Content-Neutral Regulation and the Free Trade in Ideas
Consider at one end of the spectrum the kind of case in which the Court sees no
First Amendment problem with a challenged regulation.
Generally applicable laws that prohibit conduct with no expressive significance
are thought to raise no First Amendment problem, even if they impose costs on
those engaged in protected speech. In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,292 for example,
the Court held that an injunction requiring the closure of a bookstore as a public
nuisance based on repeated incidents of prostitution and other unlawful sexual
activities on the premises required no First Amendment scrutiny because the
“sexual activity carried on in this case manifests absolutely no element of protected
expression.”293 The Court reasoned that when a regulation is not directed at
expression, the First Amendment comes into play only when it is applied to
“conduct with a significant expressive element . . . or where a statute based on a
expression will achieve optimal results. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 277, at 6–24; Stanley
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 16–49; Pierre J.
Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671,
726–30 (1983); David A. Strauss, Rights and the System of Freedom of Expression, 1993 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 202–05. The usefulness of the concept of a free marketplace of ideas for
First Amendment doctrine, however, does not depend on a consequentialist justification;
indeed, the originator of the “free trade” metaphor, Justice Holmes, made this point quite
clearly: “If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be
accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that
they should be given their chance and have their way.” Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The conception of the marketplace of ideas that emerges
from the Holmesian approach is accordingly what Professor Schauer has called a “negative”
theory of the First Amendment, premised on a lack of confidence in the exercise of
governmental power to regulate speech rather than confidence that unregulated speech can
produce anything like an optimal result. See SCHAUER, supra note 34, at 80–86. For a useful
elaboration on the Holmesian conception of constitutional protection for the marketplace of
ideas, see Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless
Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 6–7, 14–22 (2008).
291. See Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1, 16–19 (1986).
292. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
293. Id. at 705.
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nonexpressive activity has the inevitable effect of singling out those engaged in
expressive activity.”294 The Court accordingly treats generally applicable laws not
targeted at expression as raising no First Amendment issue, even when applied to
the press.295
Laws of this character pose little threat to free trade in ideas, while advancing
unquestionably legitimate governmental interests. Generally applicable laws may
increase the costs of speech for all market participants, but they have little potential
to skew free trade in ideas in favor of particular market participants. For example,
the Court has perceived no constitutional objection to a generally applicable law
requiring building permits, even when applied to a newspaper seeking to build a
new facility, since this type of generally applicable regulation is “rarely effective as
a means of censorship.”296 Moreover, because the costs they impose are not
triggered by expression—or even by conduct commonly associated with
expression—they pose little risk that they will make the cost of expression unduly
great. The bookstore owners in Arcara, for example, “remain[ed] free to sell the
same materials at another location.”297 Thus, these laws usually pose no threat to
the integrity of the marketplace of ideas sufficient to offset their justifications. To
be sure, generally applicable laws that pose unusually potent burdens on all
speakers—such as a generally applicable but confiscatory tax—might shut down
the marketplace of ideas altogether, but the likelihood that a legislature could
impose such a remarkably burdensome regulation on everyone and survive the next
election is so slight that such cases, as a practical matter, never arise.298
Generally applicable laws are not immune from First Amendment challenge,
however, when they are enforced in ways that can skew the marketplace of ideas.

294. Id. at 706–07.
295. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1991).
296. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 761 (1988).
297. 478 U.S. at 705 (footnote omitted); see also Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S.
544, 550–51, 552–53 (1993).
298. Presumably generally applicable but exceedingly harsh laws, such as a confiscatory
tax that effectively halted “free trade in ideas,” would invoke First Amendment scrutiny
without need of a doctrine that demanded First Amendment review of every generally
applicable law. One could reserve First Amendment scrutiny for unusually burdensome
regulations without requiring it in garden-variety cases not likely to involve substantial
repressive effects. In this respect, one is put in mind of yet another of Justice Holmes’s
famous dissents:
It seems to me that the State Court was right. I should say plainly right, but for
the effect of certain dicta of Chief Justice Marshall which culminated in or
rather were founded upon his often quoted proposition that the power to tax is
the power to destroy. In those days it was not recognized as it is today that most
of the distinctions of the law are distinctions of degree. If the States had any
power it was assumed that they had all power, and that the necessary alternative
was to deny it altogether. But this Court which so often has defeated the
attempt to tax in certain ways can defeat an attempt to discriminate or otherwise
go too far without wholly abolishing the power to tax. The power to tax is not
the power to destroy while this Court sits.
Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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Under Wayte, if enforcement of a generally applicable law is targeted at disfavored
speech or speakers, the First Amendment will provide a defense, as we have
seen.299 In cases of selective enforcement, the burden on the individual speaker
does not differ, but the threat to the free trade in ideas is much greater, and the
government’s otherwise legitimate interest is compromised by its failure to enforce
the law uniformly; this is what First Amendment jurisprudence characterizes as the
problem of underinclusiveness.300 In such cases, the balance tilts against the
government, and the defense of selective prosecution is recognized. Yet, as we
have also seen, when the government can identify a legitimate law-enforcement
basis for its enforcement decisions, even if they disproportionately disadvantage
those engaged in protected speech, the balance tips in the direction of the
government.301 Since selective prosecution cases involve only those who have
engaged in unprotected conduct, it does not take much of a government interest to
justify whatever skew in the marketplace of ideas that may result from prosecutive
decisions—after all, speakers who want to avoid this kind of burden need only
comply with the law.
There will be occasions, however, in which a generally applicable law is applied
to activities with a significant expressive component, as when the statutory
prohibition on burning a draft card was applied to an antiwar protest in United
States v. O’Brien.302 In this context, regulation directed at a “nonspeech element”
will be upheld “if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest . . .
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.”303 This final requirement is undemanding; it does not require, for
example, that the government select the least restrictive alternative but only that the
regulation advance the government’s interest more effectively than would be the
case absent the regulation.304
The greater scrutiny of incidental burdens on speech by laws directed at
activities with a significant expressive component is warranted by the greater risk
that even generally applicable regulation will skew the marketplace of ideas by
having a disproportionate impact on disfavored speech or speakers. After all,
majoritarian institutions are less likely to enact regulations that burden the
expressive activities of the majority than they are those of dissenters.305 Thus, we
see a modest increase in judicial scrutiny for incidental burdens on speech. Yet,

299. See supra text accompanying notes 194–97.
300. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 (1994); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524, 540 (1989); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980); First Nat’l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 793 (1978); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213–
14 (1975); Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 197, 223–35.
302. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
303. Id. at 377; accord, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62
(1994); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687–88 (1985).
304. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
67 (2006); Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 661–62; Albertini, 472 U.S. at 688–89.
305. As we have seen, the Court has acknowledged this point in its jurisprudence under
the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. See supra note 199.

2011]

FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS

65

given that such regulation is not directed at expression and advances a speechneutral interest, and given as well the difficulties in making an empirical judgment
about the degree to which different speakers and viewpoints may be
disproportionately disadvantaged by such regulations, scrutiny is modest. Again,
speakers who wish to avoid the burden imposed by such regulations need only
avoid engaging in the nonspeech activity that triggers the regulation. O’Brien, for
example, remained free to denounce the draft; he was prohibited only from
destroying his draft card. Still, the greater threat to free trade in ideas for those who
are sanctioned for expressive activities or conduct associated with expression
produces a greater measure of judicial inquiry to determine whether there is a
sufficient cost to the marketplace of ideas to offset the legitimate governmental
interests advanced by the challenged regulation.
Regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech involves a greater threat
still to the marketplace of ideas, since the regulation is directed at a means of
communication rather than some nonspeech element.306 Such regulation is
considered permissible if it is not based on the content of speech, is narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leaves open ample
alternative channels of communication.307 As with incidental restrictions, the
narrow tailoring requirement does not require use of the least-speech-restrictive
alternative but only regulation that advances the government’s interest more
effectively than would occur in its absence.308
This modest standard of scrutiny follows from the requirement of contentneutrality, which is framed to minimize the risk that the regulation is aimed at
disfavored speech or speakers: “The principal inquiry in determining content
neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in
particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys.”309 The requirement of contentneutrality minimizes the likelihood that a regulation will place identifiable speakers
or views at a disadvantage in the marketplace of ideas. Nevertheless, the concern
that majoritarian institutions, even when regulating speech in a content-neutral
manner, will be less sensitive to the interests of disfavored speakers justifies a
greater measure of scrutiny; the regulation of the time, place, and manner of
speech, unlike regulations that only incidentally burden speech, requires an inquiry

306. Regulations that trigger heightened scrutiny beyond the O’Brien standard, as Robert
Post has suggested, are more accurately characterized as directed at a medium of expression,
such as its time, place, or manner, whereas regulations not directed as a medium of
expression that nevertheless burden speech—such as the prohibition on destroying a draft
card—are properly thought to involve only incidental burdens on speech. See Robert Post,
Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1250–60 (1995).
307. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725–26 (2000); Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293–94 (1984); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647–48
(1981).
308. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 725–30; Ward, 491 U.S. at 797–99.
309. Hill, 530 U.S. at 719 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
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into the adequacy of alternative means of communication not called for under the
O’Brien test.310
Finally, for a content-neutral regulation that entirely prohibits communication of
a speaker’s preferred message—such as the statutory prohibition on disclosure of
unlawfully intercepted communications at issue in Bartnicki v. Vopper311—the
Court engages in straightforward balancing by weighing the interest in
communicating the information against the countervailing governmental interest in
protecting the privacy of communications.312 What the Court found decisive in that
case was that the communications at issue involved contentious labor negotiations
involving a public school district and a union, with union officials making veiled
threats during the intercepted conversation.313 In that context, the Court held that
“privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing
matters of public importance.”314 Although the content-neutral statutory objective
posed no inherent threat to skew the marketplace of ideas—and for that reason
triggered no talk of strict scrutiny—as applied to a context in which the
marketplace of ideas might be impoverished if deprived of information having
particular public importance, the balance tipped in favor of communication. Thus,
it was the public’s interest in obtaining the information, not merely the speaker’s
interest in conveying it, that drove the decision.
The Court has taken a similar approach to defamation. While acknowledging
that the governmental interest in protecting individual reputations is sufficiently
content-neutral to support regulation, the Court has balanced this interest against
the threat to the free marketplace of ideas posed by the potential chilling effect of
civil liability for defamation.315 For defamation involving public figures, the
Court’s concern about preserving a vibrant marketplace of ideas has led it to limit
defamation liability to cases involving intentional falsehood or reckless disregard
for truth, but when the plaintiff is not a public figure, even when the speech at issue
involves matters of public concern, the Court deems the reputational interests at
stake to be weightier and has concluded that proof of no more than negligence is
sufficient to support liability, although presumed damages cannot be awarded
without proof of knowing falsity or reckless disregard for truth.316 In contrast, when
the publication at issue addresses no matter of public concern, the Court deems the
threat to the marketplace of ideas to be reduced, and for that reason has permitted
an award of presumed damages without proof of knowing or reckless falsity.317

310. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994).
311. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
312. See id. at 526–32. Admittedly, the Court in Bartnicki is a bit opaque about the
standard of scrutiny that it is applying. For a useful explication of the brand of intermediate
scrutiny utilized in Bartnicki, see Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First
Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1117–25
(2002).
313. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518–19.
314. Id. at 534.
315. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340–42 (1974).
316. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772–75 (1986); Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 344–50.
317. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757–61
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Accordingly, in the realm of content-neutral regulation, judicial scrutiny reflects
pragmatic balancing, but is far more structured than the kind of ad hoc process
roundly condemned by the purposivists. Judicial scrutiny is proportional to the
likelihood that a regulation will skew the marketplace of ideas. When that
likelihood increases, greater weight is placed on the side of liberty, not because the
individual speaker’s interests in unfettered communication are greater, but because
the interest in a vibrant marketplace of ideas is more directly implicated. This
pattern becomes even clearer by examining regulations that are triggered by the
content of speech.
B. Content-Based Regulation and Free Trade in Ideas
There was a time when the Court proclaimed that the trigger for strict judicial
scrutiny of a challenged regulation was when it is based on the content of speech.318
This blanket condemnation of content regulation did not last. For one thing, as the
Court ultimately acknowledged, many unprotected categories of speech are
properly defined by reference to the content of expression, such as obscenity,
defamation, and fighting words.319 For another, the Court came to endorse a form
of content discrimination in its forum jurisprudence; the Court held that when the
government creates a forum in which private persons can engage in communicative
activities, albeit for a limited purpose, the government may regulate the content of
speech in that forum as long as the regulations are reasonable in light of the
underlying purposes of the forum and not an effort to suppress identifiable
viewpoints.320 Beyond that, as we have seen, the Court’s balancing jurisprudence is
itself sensitive to content—the outcome in Bartnicki and the degree of protection
granted defendants in defamation actions turn on the content of the speech at
issue.321 Thus, a categorical rule regarding content discrimination as inherently
suspect proved to be unsupportable.322 Eventually, the Court concluded that content
discrimination is not impermissible “so long as the nature of the content
discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility that official suppression
of ideas is afoot.”323
(1985) (plurality opinion); id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 774
(White, J., concurring in the judgment).
318. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99–102 (1972); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12–2 to 12–3 (2d ed. 1988).
319. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–59 (2003); R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992).
320. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677–78 (1998);
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992); United
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (plurality opinion); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 807–13 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
321. See supra text accompanying notes 311–17.
322. For academic criticism of the rule against content discrimination, see, for example,
MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 87–126 (1984); Daniel
A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J.
727, 731–47 (1980); and Paul H. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content
Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 207–31 (1982).
323. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 390; accord, e.g., Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S.
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Ultimately, the Court came to regard discrimination against disfavored speakers,
subjects, or viewpoints, as the most serious type of threat to First Amendment
values.324 Strict scrutiny is required for “content discrimination [that] ‘raises the
specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from
the marketplace.’”325 In contrast, the Court treats seemingly content-based
regulation of establishments offering sexually oriented entertainment as a contentneutral regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech subject to intermediate
scrutiny when justified by reference to the harmful “secondary effects” of such
establishments on the surrounding community as long as it leaves open sufficient
alternative avenues for sexually oriented expression.326 Similarly, seemingly
content-based regulation of solicitation near health care facilities is treated as a
time, place, or manner regulation when justified by reference to patient privacy as
long as ample alternative avenues for expression are preserved.327 Thus, even
regulation triggered by the content of expression is subject to less demanding
scrutiny when it is unlikely to unduly skew the marketplace of ideas because it
advances a content-neutral governmental interest while permitting sufficient
alternative methods of communication. In such cases, the threat to the integrity of
the marketplace of ideas is limited—as in the time, place, or manner cases. It is
when the government subjects identifiable speakers or viewpoints to regulatory
burdens not imposed on others that a threat to the integrity of competition that
judicial scrutiny becomes more demanding. In such cases, under the balancing
metric discussed here, concerns about preserving the integrity of competition in the
marketplace of ideas become more urgent.
Consider, for example, the difference between a content-neutral ban on
residential picketing of the type that the Court is likely to uphold as a reasonable
regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech,328 and a discretionary system of
permitting picketing upon payment of a fee set by local law-enforcement officials
to recoup regulatory costs that the Court would be likely to treat as content-based
and therefore subject to strict scrutiny because of the risk that the fee would be
higher for unpopular speakers that might draw hostile audiences.329 From the
standpoint of an individual speaker unable to engage in his preferred mode of
177, 188–89 (2007).
324. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898–99 (2010); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392–93.
Still, Rosenberger cautions that sometimes restrictions based on content, subject matter, or
speaker can be proxies for viewpoint discrimination. 515 U.S. at 830–32.
325. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387 (citation omitted) (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)); accord, e.g.,
Davenport, 551 U.S. at 188. This was essentially the view put forward in some of the most
powerful defenses offered of the rule against content discrimination. See, e.g., Kenneth L.
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 26–36
(1975); Stone, supra note 4, at 217–27; Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of
Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 101–
03 (1978).
326. See City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 433–42 (2002) (plurality
opinion); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–55 (1986).
327. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719–30 (2000).
328. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481–88 (1988).
329. See Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133–36 (1992).
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expression, it is far from clear which regulation is more odious. The ban on
residential picketing may deprive the speaker of what he regards as an essential
opportunity to confront an ideological opponent,330 whereas the permit fee may
involve a quite modest financial burden.331 For the individual speakers subject to
these regulations, the difference in their impact may not be great, but from the
standpoint of the marketplace of ideas, the cost of content-based regulation with a
potential to skew free trade in ideas is much higher. Content-neutral regulation, as
we have seen, is generally structured to minimize the possibility that it will distort
the marketplace of ideas in any systemic fashion. In contrast, an effective tax on
unpopular speakers could create a significant skew in the marketplace of ideas.
Accordingly, First Amendment doctrine requires much more rigorous justification
for regulation of this character in light of its greater threat to First Amendment
values.
To be sure, at first blush, the Court’s skeptical treatment of regulation that harms
disfavored speakers or viewpoints might seem to support the purposivist account.
Nevertheless, as we have seen, the Court has emphasized that a censorial
governmental motive is not required for strict scrutiny.332 More fundamentally, the
Court’s emphasis on protecting identifiable speakers or viewpoints from
disadvantageous regulation is consistent with balancing. Content regulation
demands strict scrutiny when it threatens to skew the marketplace of ideas because
in that context the systemic interests in free speech are at their height.
Nevertheless, there are times when First Amendment jurisprudence seems to
abjure balancing. For example, the Court has held that the government cannot
suppress expression as a means of avoiding giving offense to others,333 promoting
ideological unity,334 or equalizing influence in the political process.335 The Court
has similarly held that the government cannot prevent adults from having access to
nonobscene sexually oriented expression in order to protect children because
“‘[r]egardless of the strength of the government’s interest’ in protecting children,
‘[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which
would be suitable for a sandbox.’”336 More generally, the Court tells us that “[t]he
point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in

330. In Frisby, for example, the challenge to an anti-picketing ordinance was brought by
litigants who wished to engage in orderly and peaceful picketing consistent with applicable
laws governing noise and obstruction of public ways outside the home of a physician who
performed abortions at facilities in nearby communities. See 487 U.S. at 476.
331. In Forsyth County, for example, the fee demanded was only $100. See 505 U.S. at
127.
332. See supra text accompanying note 27.
333. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408–09 (1989).
334. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315–18 (1990); Johnson, 491
U.S. at 410–20.
335. See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773–74 (2008); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam).
336. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods.
Co., 463 U.S. 60, 74–75 (1983)) (second alteration in original)).
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some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content,”337 and, thus,
the government cannot “handicap the expression of particular ideas.”338 These
statements have the flavor of First Amendment absolutism, not balancing.
Still, the seemingly absolutist elements of First Amendment doctrine, on
inspection, turn out to be rather less absolutist than they might first appear. In each
case in which the Court rejected a governmental interest as illegitimate and
unworthy of balancing, the government effectively asserted an interest in skewing
the marketplace of ideas. If the promotion of ideological unity were considered a
legitimate governmental interest, for example, then First Amendment balancing
would be emptied of content—the government could always undermine free trade
of ideas by asserting its own interest in refashioning competitive balance in the
market. The ability of sexually oriented expression to compete in the marketplace
of ideas would be similarly circumscribed if only material fit for minors could be
distributed. Beyond that, even these seeming absolutes can give way to balancing
when a sufficiently compelling governmental interest comes into play that is not
itself premised on an interest in altering competitive balance among competing
ideologies.
For example, even though the Court sometimes says that the government cannot
handicap the expression of particular ideas, we have seen that when the threat of
violence becomes imminent, First Amendment protection ends even for those who
advocate violent change to the existing social or political order.339 First
Amendment jurisprudence also permits the government to prohibit membership in
an organization that advocates the violent overthrow of the government as long as
each individual subject to the prohibition has a specific intent to achieve the violent
overthrow of the government even when there is no imminent threat of violence.340
Offers or conspiracies to engage in illegal activity are also unprotected even absent
an imminent threat of illegal conduct.341 These seem to be classic cases of content,
indeed even viewpoint regulation—as well as regulation justified by the
communicative or persuasive effects of the proscribed speech—but they are
supported by unusually powerful governmental interests. The specific intent
requirement, accompanied by judicial review to ensure that the evidence establishes
that the defendant’s speech has gone beyond a mere statement of belief into the
realm of advocacy of action, is thought to provide sufficient protection of the
individual interest in free speech. Whatever the threat to the marketplace of ideas
posed by these regulations, given the government’s conceded ability to prohibit the
objective that inheres in such speech, there is simply too much danger in such
speech to warrant constitutional protection. Similarly, even though the government
cannot ordinarily prohibit speech on the ground that it will offend others, that
protection is also at an end when violence becomes imminent,342 or when the

337. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992).
338. Id. at 394.
339. See supra text accompanying note 15.
340. See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–99 (1961); Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203, 228–29 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312–27 (1957),
overruled in part on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
341. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297–98 (2008).
342. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1951).
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speaker utilizes the kind of “fighting words” that are likely to provoke violence.343
In such cases, again, unusually powerful governmental interests come into play,
and what seems like an absolute gives way to pragmatic balancing.
Indeed, recently the Court upheld a content-based and even viewpoint-based
regulation of speech under strict scrutiny, concluding that the statutory prohibition
on providing “material support” to a foreign terrorist organization was valid even
when applied to support for a terrorist organization coming in the form of speech
because of the critical national security interests advanced by the prohibition.344 At
the same time, the Court stressed that the statute did not proscribe speech except
when it was “coordinated with or under the direction of a designated foreign
terrorist organization,” thereby, “[m]ost importantly, avoid[ing] any restriction on
independent advocacy, or indeed any activities not directed to, coordinated with, or
controlled by foreign terrorist groups.”345 Independent advocacy, of course,
implicates weightier liberty interests, and presumably for that reason the Court
views its restriction as more problematic. The Court’s willingness to uphold a
statutory prohibition quite likely to be applied to disfavored speech or speakers—at
least when particularly powerful liberty interests are not at stake—demonstrates
that First Amendment jurisprudence is at its core about balancing and not
categorical protection.346

343. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 409 (1989).
344. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724–31 (2010). The
Court did not expressly utilize the term “strict scrutiny,” but stated:
The law here may be described as directed at conduct . . . but as applied to
plaintiffs the conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of
communicating a message. As we explained in Texas v. Johnson: “If the
[Government’s] regulation is not related to expression, then the less stringent
standard we announced in United States v. O’Brien for regulations of
noncommunicative conduct controls. If it is, then we are outside of O’Brien’s
test, and we must [apply] a more demanding standard.”
Id. at 2724 (alterations in original) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)). In
Texas v. Johnson, in turn, after rejecting the applicability of the O’Brien test to the flagburning statute at issue, see 491 U.S. at 403–11, the Court explained that “Johnson’s political
expression was restricted because of the content of the message he conveyed. We must
therefore subject the State’s asserted interest . . . to ‘the most exacting scrutiny.’” Id. at 412
(quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
345. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726, 2728.
346. A leading purposivist uses the imminence requirement in First Amendment
jurisprudence, see supra text accompanying notes 15, 339, to support his argument against
balancing on the ground that a regime of balancing would ban speech advocating violence on
a showing that stops considerably short of imminence. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 826–
29. Yet, as we have seen, agreements, offers, or conspiracies to engage in illegal activity are
unprotected even absent an imminent threat of illegal activity. See supra text accompanying
notes 23, 341. Thus, speech advocating illegality that goes beyond mere statements of belief
can be prohibited, at least when the speaker specifically intends to produce unlawful
conduct. Cf. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298–99 (2008) (“To be sure, there
remains an important distinction between a proposal to engage in illegal activity and the
abstract advocacy of illegality. The Act before us does not prohibit advocacy of child
pornography, but only offers to provide or requests to obtain it.” (citations omitted)). Beyond
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The First Amendment investigation reflects the same point. A First Amendment
investigation is itself a form of content-based governmental action when the
triggering event for an investigation is the content of expression—such as a
speaker’s advocacy of violence, albeit without a sufficient threat of imminent
violence to render the advocacy unprotected. Yet, as we have seen, in cases such as
Branzburg in which the Court has confronted First Amendment investigations, it
has refused to impose strict scrutiny. These cases treat with investigations, not
prohibitions, so the inhibitory effects on speech do not rise to the level of a
prohibition, while the justification for recognizing a broad investigative power is
compelling. Thus, pragmatic balancing explains why some government actions
based on the content of speech, which may well disadvantage identifiable speakers
or viewpoints, nevertheless do not trigger strict scrutiny.
Something similar can be observed in the Court’s campaign finance
jurisprudence—another type of content-based regulation. As we have seen, the
Court has treated as illegitimate a governmental interest in regulating political
speech as a means of equalizing influence in the political process.347 Although this
has led the Court to impose strict scrutiny on limitations on political speech, when
it comes to limitations on contributions to political candidates, the Court has taken
a different view, even though such regulation is no less content-based than an
absolute prohibition on certain types of political expenditures. The Court has
observed that the inhibition on speech is not so great when the government merely
restricts the ability to give money to others rather than the ability to articulate one’s
own views and that the threat of corruption is greater for contributions than
independent expenditures, and on that basis has applied a balancing test to
contribution limitations that involves something less than strict scrutiny.348 As we
also have seen, the Court has taken a similar approach to campaign-finance
that, as we have seen, the Court has held that Congress may proscribe speech that offers
material support to a foreign terrorist organization without requiring an imminent threat of
violence or other unlawful conduct. Conversely, the requirement of an imminent threat of
unlawful activity absent a properly supported finding of specific intent to produce unlawful
activity reflects an effort to balance the likely chilling effects of a regime that afforded lawenforcement officials or courts substantial leeway to determine when speech is unacceptably
likely to provoke violence or illegality:
Strong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled in
purely dulcet phrases. An advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with
spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause.
When such appeals do not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as
protected speech. To rule otherwise would ignore the “profound national
commitment” that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open.”
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1963)). For additional discussion of the potential chilling
effects of criminalizing speech based on the speaker’s purpose, see Eugene Volokh, CrimeFacilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1179–90 (2005).
347. See supra text accompanying note 335.
348. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 246–49 (2006) (plurality opinion); McConnell
v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134–42 (2003), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens United
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386–89
(2000); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23–38 (1976) (per curiam).
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disclosure requirements, upholding them under a balancing test that endeavors to
assess the degree to which they may exert a chilling effect disproportionate to their
justification.349 The rationale for this relatively lenient treatment is that disclosure
requirements are thought to impose a less serious burden on liberty interests:
“[D]isclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they . . . do not
prevent anyone from speaking.”350 This is yet another example of a challenged
government restriction that creates an inhibition on speech less potent than an
outright prohibition; and as a consequence the Court is more willing to engage in
something approaching ad hoc balancing.
In short, the structure of judicial review of content-based regulation reflects a
pragmatic balance. Given the cost to the marketplace of ideas of viewpoint-based
regulation of expression—whether an intentional effort at censorship or an
unintended result of content regulation likely to impose differential burdens on
some speakers or viewpoints—strict scrutiny tilts the balance decisively toward
free speech by requiring a showing that the challenged regulation is essential to an
unusually important government interest. Still, strict scrutiny reflects a balancing
process—it does not ignore the government’s interests, but instead requires an
especially clear showing before that interest will trump free-speech interests. When
governmental action reflects a risk of censorial motive but stops short of an outright
prohibition, however, even content-based governmental action does not trigger
strict scrutiny.
C. The Role of Ad Hoc Balancing in First Amendment Doctrine
The rather well-articulated structure of balancing in First Amendment doctrine
weakens the objections to balancing. As we have seen, large swaths of First
Amendment doctrine sharply circumscribe judicial discretion by developing a
marketplace metric within which balancing occurs in a structured fashion.
To the preceding account of First Amendment doctrine as reflecting structured
balancing, one might object that the structure of First Amendment doctrine is no
less consistent with the pragmatic than the purposivist account. As we have seen,
purposivists explain the heightened scrutiny afforded content-based regulation as
reflecting the greater risk that such regulation reflects official hostility to disfavored
speech or speakers.351 Thus, the purposivist account likely is at least as satisfactory
an explanation for the tiers of scrutiny found in First Amendment doctrine as the
account offered above. Yet, the orderly looking spectrum of regulation described
by the purposivists cannot accommodate the totality of First Amendment doctrine.
The formal standards of scrutiny found in First Amendment doctrine involve

349. See supra text accompanying note 238. The applicable “standard [of scrutiny]
‘requires a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently
important governmental interest.’ To withstand this scrutiny, ‘the strength of the
governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment
rights.’” Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at
914; Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2774 (2008) (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
350. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2818 (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914) (alterations in
original).
351. See supra text accompanying notes 4–11.
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governmental prohibitions or sanctions. For that reason, their inhibitory effect can
be assumed to be roughly constant, and the appropriate standard of review can
therefore be based on the extent to which a challenged prohibition could be thought
to skew free trade in ideas. In contrast, as we have seen, when it comes to
governmental conduct that does not involve a prohibition but instead presents a
“chilling effect,” First Amendment doctrine seems to offer little more than ad hoc
balancing that endeavors to compare the extent of the inhibition on speech to the
governmental interests at stake. Ad hoc balancing is the order of the day regardless
of the risk that the regulation at issue is premised on an improper governmental
motive.
When the government imposes something less than a prohibition on free
speech—such as in a First Amendment investigation—it seems impossible to reach
an acceptable conclusion without considering the degree of inhibition imposed by
the challenged practice as well as its justification. The regulation at issue in Meese
v. Keene, for example, may be rife with the risk of improper motive, but its
inhibitory effect was limited. The initiation of grand jury investigations may be
similarly prone to improper motives, but the consequences of constraining the
government’s ability to investigate are unacceptable, and the inhibitory effect of an
investigation, while perhaps greater than the mandated disclosures in Meese v.
Keene, is limited as well. In this fashion, ad hoc First Amendment balancing seems
inescapable, at least in contexts in which it is difficult to generalize about the extent
to which a government practice is likely to inhibit free speech.
CONCLUSION
One might think that the account of free speech doctrine advanced above
suggests that First Amendment jurisprudence is about nothing other than pragmatic
balancing. That conclusion, however, would overstate matters considerably.
First Amendment jurisprudence is not confined to pragmatic considerations; it is
replete with all of the modalities found in Philip Bobbit’s typology of constitutional
arguments,352 including historical,353 ethical,354 and structural argument.355 Yet,
these modalities of argument provide little basis for identifying the limits to First
Amendment protection, as the First Amendment investigation makes plain. It is in
identifying the limits of constitutional protection that pragmatic balancing becomes
crucial.

352. See PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–103
(1982); PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11–22 (1991).
353. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906; Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 583–85 (1983); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 276 (1963); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960); Near v. Minnesota ex
rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713–15 (1931).
354. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 24–25 (1971); W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638–42 (1943).
355. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1988); Landmark
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838–39 (1978); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791–92 (1978); N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 269–71; Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
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Historical argument, as we have seen, provides little basis for assessing the
extent of the First Amendment’s protections because of the lack of clarity about the
extent to which the bad-tendency test permitted government regulation of speech
and the press in the framing era.356 The problem with ethical and structural
argument, in turn, is that they are by their nature absolutist—any speech within the
scope of the ethical or structural principle thought to justify First Amendment
protection is immune from regulation. Consider, for example, Robert Bork’s view
that political speech is entitled to First Amendment protection.357 As we have seen,
this is not much of an historical argument,358 but it is a perfectly sound structural
argument given the centrality of political speech to the republican form of
government created by the Constitution.359 Nevertheless, because it takes a
categorical rather than a balancing approach to the First Amendment, the structural
argument for protection of political speech provides absolute immunity from
regulation within the protected category. On this view, for example, the
government seemingly would be unable to conduct any investigation of those who
advocate violence on political grounds because of the chilling effect that such an
investigation might have on political speech—a view utterly at odds with both
precedent and reason. Indeed, as we have seen, even the advocates of First
Amendment restrictions on investigations refrain from such absolutism.360 Yet, the
only other option for a structuralist would be to decide that a mere chilling effect,
unaccompanied by any type of sanction, does not amount to an “abridgement” of
free speech. As we have seen, however, this position is no more consistent with
precedent, and little more attractive, given the potential for truly abusive
investigations to chill political dissent. Only pragmatic balancing can begin to
provide a satisfactory account of the “chilling effect” problem. Any account of First

356. See supra Part I.D. A useful example is provided by the Court’s recent decision
invalidating statutory limitations on corporate-funded electioneering in Citizens United, 130
S. Ct. 876. In their separate opinions, Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens engaged in a lively
debate about whether the framing-era suspicion of corporations provided relevant historical
evidence of the original meaning of the First Amendment. Compare id. at 925–29 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that there is no framing-era evidence supporting regulation based on the
identity of the speaker), with id. at 948–52 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that in the
framing era comprehensive regulation of corporations was thought warranted). Whatever
one makes of this debate, however, given the breadth of regulatory power under the framingera bad-tendency test and the ample evidence that Congress believed that corporate-funded
electioneering had a corrupting effect, see id. at 961–68, it would seem easy to uphold the
regulation at issue in Citizens United under the framing-era bad-tendency test except for the
many difficulties, explored in Part I above, in determining whether the bad-tendency test, at
least in its broadest formulations, should be considered binding as a matter of original public
meaning.
357. See supra text accompanying note 125–26.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 127–28.
359. For leading structural accounts of the First Amendment along these lines, see, for
example, JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105–16 (1980); ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 1–27 (Lawbook
Exchange 2000) (1948); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,
1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 526–65.
360. See supra text accompanying note 242.
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Amendment jurisprudence that ignores pragmatic balancing is, at best, seriously
incomplete.
Interestingly, Judge Bork, one of the most rigorous originalists of our time,361
eventually repudiated his position that the First Amendment protects only political
speech, concluding that a rule protecting only political speech would be too easily
circumvented, and conceding that much nonpolitical speech ultimately advances
the search for political truth as well.362 That sounds like pragmatism to me. When it
comes to the First Amendment, one finds pragmatism even in the most unexpected
places.

361. One observer characterized Judge Bork as “the leading contemporary advocate of
originalist strict construction.” Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 1333, 1338 (1992).
362. See BORK, supra note 128, at 333.

